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PREFACE 
The simulstion study documented in this report was  carried out as 
a collaborated effort by Serendipity, Inc. and the Man Machine Integration 
Branch (MMIB) of the Biotechnology Division at the Ames Research Center. 
Mr .  Charles C. Kubokawa of MMIB provided guidance and direction in the 
design of the study and participated in the execution of the simulation 
exercises. His  ideas and services in the implementation of the study were  
important contributions to the completion of the project and are hereby 
acknowledged. 
Mr.  Kenneth M. Baldwin and Mr.  William J. Ereneta were the 
Mr .  Baldwin principal contributors on the Serendipity project staff. 
coordinated the development and operation Df the simulation facility and 
designed and programmed the data acquisit.ion procedures for the SEL 840 
computer system. Mr. Ereneta conducted many of the simulation sequences 
acting as the experimenter and carried oct analyses of the data obtained on 
subject-pilot task performance. 
The contributions of many other inc,ividuals, both Ames personnel 
and Serendipity staff, were  also esseatiai. 1.0 the design ar-' conduct of the 
study. 
and contributions of all the people w!io pari.icipated in this project. 
The presentation which follows is ntended to reflect the efforts 
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A SIMULATOR STUDY OF FLIGHT MANAGEMENT TASK 
PERFORMANCE DURING LOW VISIBILITY APPROACH AND LANDING 
USING BASELINE CATEGORY I1 FLIGHT INSTRUMENTATION 
By Walter B. Gartner 
SUMMARY 
In earlier research efforts, the importance of effective flight manage- 
Subsequent anhlysis of piiot 
ment task performance during low visibility approach and landing operations 
in civil jet transport aircraft was established. 
information processing associated with the performance of flight manage - 
ment tasks indicated that the pilot's effectiveness in satisfying certain flight 
management task requirements, using flight instrumentatioc assumed to 
be available in a baseline low visibility landing system (LVLS) is in serious 
doubt. 
The simulation research project documented in this report w a s  con- 
ducted as an empirical extension of the earlier analytic study (ref. i). 
It is the first  of a ser ies  of projects which are being designed to assess  tile 
potential flight management problems defined in the analysis md, subse - 
quently, to develop and test such solution concepts as changes in flight 
1 
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instrumentation, crew preparation, and system operating procedures. 
In this initial study, the investigation was focused on the command pilot's 
ability to judge h i s  approach tb the authorized Category I1 minimum 
decision altitude (100 feet above the runway) and on the effects of various 
flight path offset conditions at this decision height on his ability to car ry  
out the landing maneuver. 
by Serendipity and the Man-Machine Integration Branch at the A i m s  
Research Center. 
The study was  carried out as  a joint effort 
Twelve currently active senior airline pilots, individually certified 
for Category I1 opLrations, f lew a total of 252 approach and landing 
sequences under simulated Category I1 visibility conditions (1200- and 
1600-feet R'VR) and data was  taken on the accuracy of selected estimates 
and judgments of the flight situation. 
flown under various combinations of three al?ernative pilot operating 
procedures and three different flight control modes to determine the 
effects cf these variables on the accuracy of flight progress judgments. 
The data octained in this study support the contention that baseline flight 
irstrumentztion wi l l  be inadequate for accurate monitoring and assess- 
ment of the approach to Categury I1 operating minimums. 
The approach sequences were 
2 
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INTRUDU C TIOM 
One of the principal conclusions of a recent analysis of system 
concepts and operational problems in the development of ar, all weatheL- 
landing capability for advanceu commercial jet transport aircraft (ref. 2) 
w a s  that the main impediments to the introduction of all weakher landing 
involved operational procedures rather than individual technical problems. 
The role of the pilot in managing the aircraft w a s  cited as a major source 
of controversy and it was  concluded that methods of using the crew to 
monitor performance of the autamatic equipment and a definition of 
c r e w  procedures for varicus failure situations are critical problems 
which remain to be worked out for low visibility approach and lapding 
operations. A clear statement of the importance of resolving the many 
outstanding issues with respect to the pilot's role in all weather landing 
operations is given by Beck in the conclusion to a comprehensive over- 
view of c r e w  factor problems in achieving Category I1 operational 
goals (ref. 3) .  
Beginning with the initiation of a Category I1 approach, the success 
of each segment of the f l i ~ h t ,  as i t  prcgressc s toward the touch- 
doim and rollout, depends on a compatible pilot/ aircraft relationship 
that can react properly to a d  take cognizance of each of the 
multitudinous factors that w i l l  be involved in making this approach 
consistent, reliable, of high quality, and abo-re all  operationally 
safe. 
national Federation of A i r  Line Pilots made the following statement: 
It is the 7tudy Group's view that, in the very low minima envisaged, 
it is 70 longer possible to compromise and make exceptions to 
accommodate unique circumstances. The operation is too critical 
for that. Standardization now becomes essential. If ALL require- 
ments cannot be met, the operation should not take place". 
In October, 1965 the All-Wcather Study Group of the h t e r -  
1 1  
In view of the many problems which remain to be resolved, why 
should such operations take place? Former F A A  Administrator Najeeb 
Halaby, now a senior executive with Pan American World Airways, h a s  
cited the three prhcipal  reasons in  an article on current developments 
3 
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in all-weather operations (ref. 4 
operate with instrume1,ted precision duriilg bad weather, we can systema- 
tize operations during good weather SCJ a s  to reduce incidents and accidents 
. . . ), the second is reliability ("The traveler wants to deplane at his rea l  
destination at the time promised.. . ), and the third is e f f ic ien9  !"Not 
having all-weather capability costs the airlines, it has been esiimated, 
about $70 million a year beyond regular on-time operations"). In the 
same article, Halaby also made it clear that Pan Am, at least, iullv 
intends to conduct flight Operations under the lower visibility conditions : 
The firsc reason i.s safety ("If we can 
I f  
1 1  
To confirm that we mean business, I cite the expenditure of 
$13-million on our present fleet to qualify i ts  equipment to 
progress from Category I to Category 11 operations. This is 
for eqi :pment only and does not include the costs of the most 
ad-.-anced training for pilotb and copilots and for simulators, 
etc. 
If these operations a re  to take place, and if safety, reliability and 
cast-effectiveness goals are to be achieved, the critical problem of 
effective flight management must be considered. 
efforts (ref. l), a comprehensive analysis of I tquirements for flight 
management task Ferformaiice during low visibility approach and 
landi .-g operations was conddcted. From these efforts, it w a s  concluded 
that certain of these tasks wi l i  impose excessive information processing 
demands on the Captain. 
In earlier resesrch 
This analysis was based on a projection of flight instrumentation 
and crew roles envisioned for a baseline low vieibility landing system. 
The general concern of the analysis w a s  to determine b-ow well the 
command pilot would be supported by this system in carrying out h is  
flight management responsibilities. 
ment activities is concerned, each of the suspect tasks identified in the 
analysis points to a potential inadequacy in prqjected landing syatem 
design features and / o r  operatimal procedures. 
Insofar as  support fcr flignt manage - 
A s  a point Df departure for the analysis, flight management was 
distinguished froin othelr in-fl;.:.*ht cn - < .  \ (. ,mtrol functions, sclch as  
- Serendipity inc. 
flight control and navigation, as being concerned with assessing the on- 
going flight situation, judging the significance of aircraft and subsystem 
operating states, and with formulating and resoiving action decision 
problems arising out of these assessments. 
adopt a f i rm position with respect to the pilot's role in implementing the 
flight management function, as indicated in the following excerpt (ref.  5) : 
It was also necessary to 
In any systematic consideration of the means required to 
implement system functions in man-machine systems, 
issues arise regarding the assignment or  allocation of 
functions to either man, machine, o r  man-machine compo- 
nents. Such issues are seldom straightforward or  easily 
resolved on the basis of explicit and widely accepted cr i -  
teria, and these di'ficulties are compounded in flight 
management activities by considerations of "responsibility " 
and "authority. 
it can be said that responsibility has to do with the conse- 
quences or  effects of system performance and involves the 
notion of accountability for these outcomes; authority has 
to do with the means provided for direct and effective 
control over the system being managed. 
The general position underlyinf the present study is that 
issues expressed in te rms  of 'allocation of functions to man 
or  machine" or  "degree of automation" a re  misleading in 
s a l i n g  with ''command " or  management " functions in 
manned systems. 
by the assignment (or assumption) of responsibility for  
achieving system performance objectives and satisfying 
established safety and economic constraints than by the 
means employed. 
can only be assumed by people, in this instance, the pilot- 
in-command. When severe demands are imposed on their 
ability to make the necessary judgments and decisions, pro- 
visions must be made for more adequately supporting 
managementlcommand personnel. Corresponding provisions 
must be incorporated into the system design to give the 
pilot -to-command the necessary authority to impiement 
management decision, e. g . ,  provisions for entering command 
data and /or  effecting corrective actions. 
This assertion should not be construed as imposing arbit!-ary 
constraints on the extent to which particular component func- 
tions of the flight management function can be mechanized or  
automated. 
case of a fully automated system, the pilot-in-command must 
be equipped to Lssess the overall flight situation and the 
particular conditions encountered to determine ;the manner 
I 1  With considerable over sirnplification, 
I 1  
Such functions a re  distinguished more 
It is here asserted that this responsibility 
It simply means that even in  the hypothetical 
5 
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in which the system wi l l  be employed (e. g., the on-line 
configuratior! of equipment units and their operating mode) 
as  well a s  any corrective actions necessary to achieve 
operational objectilies. No restrictions, as such, a r e  thus 
placed on the degree of au tomat ic  of such system design 
features as self-monitoring and automatic mode switching 
or disconnect. System design provisions of this sort  are 
seen as one means of supor t ing  the pilot-in-command, 
This study is the first of a se r ies  of projects which are being designed 
to provide an assessment of the problems defined in the analysis and, sub- 
seqkently, to develop and test such solution concepts a s  changes in flight 
instrumentation, crew preparation, and system operating procedures. 
The investigation was focused on the pilot's ability to judge his approach 
to the authorized Category I1 minimum decision height (100 feet above 
the runway) and on the effects of various flight path offset conditions at 
the decision height on his ability to successfully car ry  out the landing 
maneuver. 
Airline pilots currently qualified for Category I1 approach and landing 
operations served a s  subjects in the study. 
designed to assess  pilot performance of selected approach assessment 
tasks under nominal Category I1 operating conditions, using simulated 
information inputs representing the ongoing flight situation as they 
would be presented to command pilots in the projected operational enuiron- 
ment. 
The simulator runs were 
The specific objectives of the simulation exercise were: 
1. To determine the accuracy of the command pilot's estimates 
of relative altitude (i. e . ,  the aircrqft 's height above the 
ifitended touchdcwn point an thz  runway) during the approach, 
especially the accuracy of his estimate of arrival at the 
authorized 100 -foot decision height; 
Serendipity inc. 
2. To dete?mi:-e the accuracy of pilot estimates of cross-track 
positioii (i. e., lateral deviation from the localizer course) 
and thr\ accuracy of his judgments of tl-ie aircraft 's  direction 
of fliI;ht relative to the runway; 
3. To deterinine the effects of three different pilot operating 
procedures and three alternate flight control modes on the 
accuracy of these flight progress tudgrnents; and 
4. To determine the effects of various fEght path offset conditions 
whick can occur at the decision height. on the success of 
manually controlled landing mane?: em. 
For the reader's convenience, the analysis of potential problems in 
judging the success of e. C:,tegory II approach, from which the foregoing 
study objective were derived, is reproduced as Appendix A to this report. 
Analyses of the data recorded during the simulation exercise and docu- 
mented in this report provides an estimate of the number and type of 
errors in pilot judgment which may be expected to occur in actual flight 
operations under the conditions represented. 
results is related to the iesues discussed in Appendix ~ 1 .  
also intended to support subsequent simulation research projects by 
distinguishing the particular components of the flight maaagement t a s k  
on which difficulties a re  expected, if  any, and by providing baseline 
performance data against which various system design changes, revisions 
in operating procedures, performance under different t a s k  conditions, 
etc., can subsequently be assessca. 
The interpretation of these 
The study was 
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METHOD 
Overview of How the Study Was  ConducTLd 
The basic plan of the study can be understood as  a test of the extent 
to which the information environment projected for the baseline low visibil- 
ity landing system (LVLS) can be expected to support the command pilot in 
his assessment of approach success, The information environment is com- 
prised, primarily, of f.light deck instruments and auditory display channels 
(e. g, , aural warning signals and radio voice communications), and study 
results may be expected to apply to the selection or  development of these 
landing system components. It also includes flight planning data and in- 
flight reference materials (e. go, clearances, approach charts, flight data 
sheets, etc.), the a i r  and ground environment, and the stored (in memory) 
products of learned procedures and perceptual expectancies. 
It should be clear that the study was not intended, in any sense, to 
evaluate the quality of the individual pilot's judgmental or  decision making 
abilities. The experimental plan gave explicit consideration to controlling 
the effects of individual differences in pilot skills in this area. More- 
over, during a debriefing session, pilots were asked to provide critical 
evaluations of the information and display characteristics available to 
them in the simulation. The pilot's primary role was  to car ry  out 
assigned approach management and landing control tasks in accordance 
with the orientation given. Insofar as i t  is feasible to do so, pilot 
selection and orientation to the experimental task was  directed toward 
achieving behavior in the simulator that could be construed as representa- 
tive of the behavior of command pilots in an actual operational situation. 
An overview of the structure of the simulation study is presented 
in Figure 1. Each run in  the simulator represented the execution of an 
approach and landing sequence. The sequence was initiated with the 
9 
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aircraft at approximately ten nautical miles from the runway, stabilized 
on the assigned localizer course, and maintaining an assigned initial 
approach altitude. The run ended with the aircraft on the runway deceler- 
ating to a nominal turn-off speed, or with the pilot's decision to reject 
the approach and initiate a go-around. During this simulated flight 
sequence, pilots performed Specified flight management tasks, responding 
to simulated iniormation inputs to the command pilot. These inputs were  
intended to represent the ongoing flight situation as it is presented in the 
LVLS and impose the same information processing demands on pilots in 
the simulation as those associated with the operational situation. To 
accomplish this objective, both the flight information provided and the 
display characteristics (i. e. , presentation mcde, type of display, and 
display-referent relationships) were carefully matched to their assumed 
counterparts in the baseline system. 
On each run, data on pilot performance were  recorded as indi- 
cated by the pilot outputs shown in Figure 1. At the same time, data 
were recorded on the "actual" position and behavior of the aircraft as  
represented in the simulation sequence and, where appropriate, on the 
corresponding display of flight situatior, parameters which, presumably, 
served as  the immediate basis for pilot judgments. Objective data 
on the simulated flight situation (e. g., actual aircraft track) and on 
pilot judgments (e. g., estimated cross-track position) were used 
to derive accuracy scores for determining how well  the specified 
flight management tasks were performed. In addition, subjective data 
obtained in debriefing sessions (e. go pilot's reports of how judgments 
were made and appraisals of flight instruments) were available to support 
the interpretation of objective performance data. 
Notice that simulated information inputs, pilot task assignments, and 
the data taken were held constact on ai' baseline simulator runs .  Controlled 
10 
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variations in the flight path actually followed (e. g., I I S  deviation, actual 
la teral  and vertical offset I;-sition at  the decision height, etc.) and 
environmental conditions (e. g. , terrain profiles approaching the dicision 
height, runway visibility, etc. ) were represented in the information 
inputs in order to include a number of different flight situations for sub- 
jects to re,s;jond to. 
to simulation runs was worked out to ensure an appropriate sampling of 
conditions of interest. 
A systematic assignment of these variable conditions 
The stua;r was  also designed to examine the effects of alterna- 
tive c r e w  proceduzes and control task loadings on flight management 
task performance and to examine landing performance from various 
flight path offset Conditions at the decision height. 
pracedures can be distinguished by citing differences in the pre-arranged 
assignment of specific monitoring and/ or  control duties to the Captain 
and Fi rs t  Officer. It is reasonable to assume that flight management 
performance would be differentially affected by such variations, since the 
immediate bases for making the approach success judgments, in terms of 
information available and display modes, w i l l  not be the same when alter-  
native .crew procedures are auopted. Alternative flight control modes 
(i. e., fully automatic, split-axis control, and fully manual) were examined 
to disclose the effects, if any, of differences in task loading on the Captain. 
When manual control is assumed for one or  more axes, the Captain can 
be expected to have less time and attention to apply to flight management 
tasks, per  se. 
Variations in crew 
Baseline runs were conducted with a fully-coupled automatic flight 
control mode simulated and employing a crew procedure wherein the 
Captain exercises complete control of the approach to the decision height. 
As the aircraft  approache6 the decisiop height, the Captain continuously 
assesses  -.is altitude above the runway and flight path alignment with the 
runway by instrument reference. 
altitude he goes head-up" to assess  the adequacy of external visual 
On arr ival  at the 100-foot decision 
1 1  
12 
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rLlerence, resolve the landing commitment decision and, at that point, 
either abort the approach or assume manual control to complete the landing 
maneuver. A s  indicated in Figure 1, six iterations of the baseline scheme 
were  carried out to examine the effects 01 alternative flight control modes 
and crew procedures. The structure of the study, a s  schematized, was 
essentially unchanged in these iterations, but in each of the iterations a 
different combination of control mode and c r e w  procedure was represented 
to  govern the pilot's 
sequence. 
task orientation and the simulation of the flight 
The Simulated Approach and Landing Flight Sequence 
The operational context adopted as a framework for the experimental 
manipulations in the study was  a Category I1 approach and landing sequence. 
For  convenience, the recently published Category I1 approach to runway 
1R at Dulles International Airport (DIA) was selected to define the assigned 
flight profile and -;'as used on all simulation runs as the reference profile. 
The current Approach Chart for this profile is reproduced in Figure 2. 
Specific festures of the simulation profile, which may differ from those 
shown in Figure 2, and descriptions of controlled variations in simulated 
flights paths wil l  be made with reference to this approach. 
Controlled Variations in Flight Profiles 
Since the principal concern of the simulation lsequence was to exercise 
pilots in specified approach assessment tasks, it was considered de- 
sirable to include a number of different flight situations for them to judge. 
The key parameters on which the approach was assessedwere: 
1. Vertical offset (altitude relative to the runway), 
2. Lateral offset (cross-track position), and 
3. Tracking vector (alignment of the aircraft 's  horizontal flight 
13 
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path with the localizer course, i. e. , parallel, converging, 
or diverging), as  the aircraft  approaches the decision 
height. 
b y  systematicallv varying the values assigned to these parameters on any 
given run and providing for reasonable variations in flight path control 
earlier in the approach, nine different profiles w e r e  defined to cover all 
of tne different flight situations which were of interest in the stud77 
profiles were  defined as indicated in Table 1, by combining three vertical 
offset conditions ("on", "high", and tllowl' ) with three lateral  offset con- 
ditions ("on", 
ditions ("parallel", converging", and ''diverging"). Each of these 
combinations defines a different flight situation at the  decision height and 
may thus be construed as the "terminal condition'' for a given approach. 
One of three possible variations in  approach history was associated with 
each of these terminal conditions: a ' 'cross-overrl flight path defined by 
sinusoidal variations around the assigned profile, a consistent tendency to 
be either "high" o r  "low" on the  glide slope, or a consistent tendency to 
be to  the "right" or ''left" of the localizer course. 
These 
1 1  marginal", and ''excessive'') and three tracking vector con- 
1 1  
A tenth profile has been identified in Table 1 a s  a reminder that the 
controlled variations in simulated flight paths called for in profiles P-l 
through P-9 were generated only on simulation runs for which the auto- 
mzitic flight control mode was  specified. 
w a s  exercie. -1 on one or more axes and the corresponding flight path 
parameters (i. e. ,  ve*i.cal offset when pitch axis control is manual, 
lateral  offset and tracking vectors whe:l control of the roll axis is also 
manual) then, of course, assumed whatever values resulted from the 
pilot's performance of the control task. 
On some runs, manual control 
The intended application of the profiles defined in  Table 1 in the  
i n  judging a study was, as already indicated, to exercise the 
w d e r  range of flight situations than would be the case if only typical" 
pilots 
I 1  
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Table 1. Definition of Alternative Flight Profi les for Controlled Simulation Sequences, 
Terminal Condition Approach History 
Profi le 
Designator 
P-l 
P-2 
P-3 
P-4 
P-5 
P-6 
P-7 
P-8 
P-0 
P-IO 
Verti ca I bteral Tracking G lideslope 
on on para I le I cross-over 
on marg ina I diverg ing high 
on excessive converging low 
high on diverging cross-over 
high marginal converging high 
low on converging cross-over 
low marginal parallel high 
Offset Vector Tracking Offset -
high excessive parol le I low 
low excessive diverging low 
(As attained by manual fli&t path control) 
Localizer 
Tracking 
cross-over 
left 
right 
rieht 
cross-over 
left 
left 
right 
cross-over 
o r  "in-tolerance" runs w e r e  simulated. For this reason, excessive 
deviations from optimum control system performaacc? were deliberately 
included without regard to the probability of the i r  actual occurrence in the 
operational situation. The ,intent w a s  to  include some marginal and 
excessive offset conditions to provide a more complete sample of situations 
to be judged. A systematic procedure w a s  defined for specifying the pro- 
file to be followed on each run to ensure that pilots 
similar run patterns and that similar run patterns were used for alternate 
experimental conditions. 
were exposed to. 
Controlled Variations in  Environmental Conditions 
Simulated flight sequences are further defined by variations in the 
environmental conditions represented during the run  series. These include 
18 
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irregularities in terrain elevation approaching the runway, weather 
and runway visibility conditions, the location and characteristics of final 
approach a a r k e r  beacons, the approach and runway lighting system, the 
location and operating characteristics of ILS antennas, and runway 
characteristics. 
contr-d,led variations in these conditions which w e r e  included in the 
simulation sequence is given below: 
A brief statement of the more important features and 
a. Terrain elevation - controlled variations in terrain elevatim 
appFoaching the runway were included in order to provide a more 
complete test of the pilot's ability toassess relative altitude. 
Twc variati ms in the comparatively level terrain situation repre- 
sented by the actual approachto DIA ( the profile designated TP-1 
in Figure 3 )  were  defined. 
a sharp 5rop in terrain elevation on 'he approach end of the 
runway (TP-2 in Figure 3 ) .  With this terrain profile, ab- 
solute altitude at the decision height would be 140 feet and 
One of these is characterized by 
arrival at the decision height", if it were judged by reference 
to a radio altimeter without considering the difference between 
absolute and relative altitude, would occur quite late in xhe 
approach. 
characterized by rising terrain off the approach end of the 
runway. Wi th  this terrain profile, arrival at the decision 
height" again judged without explicit consideration of terrain 
elevation, would occur early. 
I 1  
The second variation (TP-3 in Figure3 ) is 
' I  
b. Weather ceiling and runway visibility - on all runs, the fade- 
in of visual cues, representing the penetration of cloud cover 
in the vicinity Qf the runway, occurred within the decision 
region, i. e.,  between the middle marker and the decision 
height. 
judging relativt Sltiiude and to vary the conditions affecting 
the landing commitriient decision, two variations in runway 
visibility were represented by simulating a runway visual 
To preclude the use of emerging visual cues for  
3 
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range (RVR) of 1200 feet on some runs and 1600 feet on others. 
Location and characteristics of final approach marker beacons - 
an outer marker beacon located 4.6 nautical miles from the 
- C. 
runway, a middle marker at 0.6 nautical miles, and an 
inner marker at 0.2 nautical miles, as shown in Figure 2, 
were represented in the simulatior.. 
d. Approach and runway lighting system - a visual guidance 
system, consisting of configuration "A" approach lights with 
sequenced fiashing lights, high intensity runway edge lighting, 
touchdown zone lights, and centerline lighting w a s  represented 
on the visual flight attachment. 
e. Location and operp2ing characteristics of I S  antennas - a 
standard I1 C, installation was represented with the localizer 
antenna a r ray  located a nominal 1000 feet beyond the far end 
of the runway and with the glide slope antenna located 1000 feet 
from the runway threshold. 
the localizer beam was precisely aligned with the designated 
localizer course at DIA (006') and the glide slope was  
accurately aligned with a 2.5' vertical approach path, 
Allowable deviations in beam alignment, in accordla.nce with 
ICAO standards, were considered in the analysis and inter- 
pretation of data, but not included iri the simulation. 
In the simulation sequence 
f. Runway characteristics - runway elevation, length, and 
width were as specified for runway 1R at DIA, i. e. , 313 feet 
Meaii Sez Level (MSL)? 11,5QC feet, and 150 feet, respectively. 
All  weather runway markings were not. represented. 
21 
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Apparatus 
The simulation facility used for this study was an Ames Research 
Center fixed-base transport simulator equipped with a closed-circuit 
color television visual display attachment, The principal components 
of the facility and a generalized representation of signal flow are 
schematized in Figure 4. The principal components of the facility are: 
(1) the crew compartment, (2) visual display system, (3) the analog 
computation of aircraft equations of motion and display functions, and 
(4) data recording equipment. A brief characterization of the design 
features and functional capabilities of each of these components is de- 
lineated below. Emphasis has been placed upon the identification of the 
means selected for meeting various study requirements rather than 
providing a detailed description of the mechanization of simulation 
functions . 
Crew Compartment 
The c r e w  compartment was a conventional transport-type cab 
mounted on a stationary raised platform. Two forward facing seats w e r e  
installed with a control pedestal in the usual location between the seats. 
Functional control columns and rudder pedals w e r e  available at both 
c r e w  stations, but complete instrumentation was provided only at  the 
Captain's station on the left side. The left seat served as the pilot's 
station. 
Flight instruments and controls available to the Pilot were 
located as shown on the station configuration drawing (Figure 5). No 
attempt was made to reproduce the flight deck configuration for a parti- 
cular aircraft type, 
the same information as that available in the projected baseline landing 
system for the approach and landing tasks and by employing functionally 
equivalent displays, i, e,, instrumentation that imposes the same kind 
of information processing requirements on the pilot. In general, only 
The requirements of the study were met by providing 
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the controls and instrumentation which directly support the selected ex- 
perimental tasks were  provided. For  this reason, complete engine 
instrumentation and system status/warning displays were not installed. 
Pr imary flight situation/director information was  provided by the 
Collins FD-109 Integrated Flight System operating in the approach mode 
(mode selector set to GS AUTO) and equipped with expanded scale local- 
izer  deviation indicator elements. The rising runway (absolute altitude) 
ipdicator was  not used in the present study. Display elements of the 
Flight Director Indicator (FDI) and Course Indicator (CI), the principal 
display units af the FD-109 system, a re  more clearly represented in 
Figure 6. The details of other pilot station flight instruments and con- 
trols are also shown in this figure. The characteristics of the pilot 
station flight instrumentation are outlined in Table 2. 
An experimenter was seated at the station to the right of the 
pilot's seat. This position allowed the experimenter to observe the 
pilot's behavior during simulator runs and to monitor the flight instru- 
ments and external visual display available to the pilot. No controls o r  
instrumentation were at this location. However, the experimenter w a s  
equipped with a separate TV monitor of the external visual field, and 
with a headset and microphone which he used to communicate with both 
the pilot and the simulation facility operators via an intercom system. 
Visual Flight Attachment 
The Visual Flight Attachment (VFA) used in the study w a s  designed 
and manufactured by General Precision Systems, Ltd., and is comprised 
of a moving-belt type terrain model, a closed-circuit TV camera and 
optical attackmeat, 2 TV projection syetex, twz rnmitors equipped with 
virtual image lenses, and various rack-mounted control equipment. Op- 
eration of the V F A  is controlled by signal inputs from the simulation 
computer. Relative movements of the camera, optical attachment, and 
terrain model associated with X, Y ,  and Z axes and aircraft attitude pro- 
duce changes in the displayed picture. These movements are produced 
by electronic servo systems controlled by corresponding d r ive  signals 
from the simulation computer. 
2s 

Serendipity inc. 
Table 2 . Characteristics of Pilot - station Flight Instrumentation. 
Name 
of 
Ins trumerit 
Airspeed .............. 
Altimeter.. ............ 
Radio Altitude.. ........ 
Vertical Speed.. ........ 
Thrust. ................ 
Flap Position.. ........ 
Trim.  ................. 
Flight Director 
a)Pitch Attitude.. ...... 
b)RoU Attitude. ........ 
c)Expanded Localizer.. . 
d)Glide slope - beviation . 
e) Minimum Decision A l t  
Course Indicator 
a) Heading ............ 
b) Course.. ............ 
c)Course Deviation.. ... 
d)Glide slope Deviation . 
Touchdown. ............ 
Approach Progress  ..... 
Marker Beacon. ........ 
Landing Gear  Position ... 
Scale-pointer 
Scale -pointer 
Drum 
Scale -pointer 
S c d e  - p ointe r 
Scale -pointer 
Scale -pointer 
Relative Position 
R e  la tive Pos i tion 
Relative Position 
Scale-pointer 
Relative Position 
Relative Position 
Light 
Scale -pointer 
Drum 
Relative Position 
Re  lative P os i ti on 
Lights 
Lights 
Lights 
Lights 
Range 
~ 
0-800 knots 
0- 1090 feet 
0-99950 feet 
0-2500 feet 
Of30000 fpm 
0-20000 lbs 
0 (up) to 5Oo(down1 
L + goo 
36Q0.' 
b + 60' 
0+75 - pa 
02150 pa 
360' 
360' 
05150 pa 
051 50 pa 
Lowest 
Scale 
Division 
20 knots 
50 feet 
100 feet 
10 feet 
100 fpm 
1,000 lbs 
loo 
5O 
loo 
7 5 p a  
7 5 p a  
5O 
lo 
75 pa 
7 5 p a  
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servo systems controlled by corresponding drive signals from the simu- 
lation computer. 
On all runs in this study, the descent to the decision region (between 
200feet and the 100-foot decision height) w a s  conducted with the externalvisual 
scene obscured to represent an"in-cloud'' condition. . The fade-in ofvisual cues 
began at a point inthe decision regicnand with the degree of obccuration appro- 
priate to the selected runway visual range (RVR) conditions. A RVR of 
either 1200 or  1600 feet was selected at the Remote VFA Control Console 
pr ior  to each run. Subject-pilots executed the landin, aaneuver by 
reference to the visual display on every run. 
Analog Computation 
The AD256 and TR48 analog computers were used to  furnish the 
drive signair; for flight instruments and the visual flight attachment. A 
DC-8 aircraft was  represented in the aerodynamic simulation and all 
aerodynainic control and aircraft configuration effects occurring in routine 
approach and landing operations were  included. Ground effect w a s  computed. 
The computation of earth-referenced flight situation quantities (e. g., flight 
path coordinates, ILS deviation, absolute altitude, etc.) was  based on the 
representation of an approach to the runway 1R at Dulles International Air- 
port and on the selected variations in environmental conditions cited earlier. 
Basic flight path control computations were  driven, as they typically 
are in piloted flight simulators, by manual control inputs from the 
pilot. In order to generate the controlled variations in the flight profiles, 
it w a s  necessary to add an "automatic" flight path control mode and then to 
further modify this operating mode to provide for "split-axis" control. 
In the fully automatic mode, values for flight path defining parameters Y 
(lateral deviation from the runway centerline extended) and 2 (height 
above the runway) were programmed on diode function generators as 
functions of X (distance from the glide slope intersection r i t h  the runway) 
for  the nine different approach profiles (see Table 1)  which were, in  turn, 
used to control aircraft position. In effect, the computer then acted as 
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a controller. Y and 2 inputs available from the diode function generators 
for a designated profile were  combined with actual aircraft position 
coordinates to generate e r r o r  signals which were  then used to generate 
the necessary control inputs for following the selected profile. The 
pilot was  thus relieved of the manual flight control task, just as he 
would be when using the autopilot-LLS coupler in the actual aircraft. 
In the split-axis mode, the pilot retained manual control of the 
pitch axis while rol l  axis control was derived from programmed values 
of the Y function. When this mode was  selected, the vertical component 
of the flight path an( associated display functions were  governed by manual 
control column displacements rather than programmed values of 2. The 
automatic and split-axis modes were selected by placing the AFCS MODE 
SELECT control in the crew compartment (see Figure 5) in the AUTO 
(automatic) o r  ROLL ONLY (split-axis) positions. 
AFCS DISENGAGE switch located on the left side of the pilot's control 
wheel returned the computer to the full manual mode, wherein the 
computations were  again driven by manual control inputs f rom the pilot. 
Depression of the 
Automatic control of pilot- selected command airspeeds w a s  also 
included in the simulation. When the A/T selector (Figure 5) wab ir, the 
ON position, the basic computation of indicated ~ r s p e e d  (V) on the basis 
of throttle position and aerodynamic forces was  interrupted. A simplified 
autothrottle function was  then simulated by maintaining V within - +5 knots 
of the pilot-selected command airspeed (ITc). Only two command air- 
speeds were used in the problem: an initial approach speed of 150 knots 
at the beginning of the run and a change to a final approach speed of 135 
knot8 when X w a s  approximately 36,000 feet, i. e., when the aircraft 
was  one dot below the glide slope. The airspeed change was  commanded 
by the pilot using the CMD AIS SELECT control (Figure 5). 
Depression of the AFCS DISENGAGE switch also served to terminate 
the simulation of the autothrottle function and V w a s  again computed ori the 
basis of throttle position and aerodynamic factors. To minimize transition 
problems when the autothrottle function w a s  terminated, the throttles were 
30 
Surendlpity inc. 
positioned, prior to initiation of automatic runs, 63 that computed V for 
conditions at the decision height did not difrer excessively from the 135 
knot command airspeed. 
Flight Instruments 
The simulation of the primary flight deck display functions was  
a straightforward product of the solution of aerodynamic equations and the 
application of computer outputs, via suitable buffering and scaling ampli- 
fiers and synchro converters, to the iwtruments at the subject's station. 
Special mention must be made, however, of the si-,iulation of flight 
director commands, expanded localizer deviation, radio altitude, and 
minimum altitude indications. Flight director pitch and rol l  commands 
were  computed by the 562P-1E pitch computer and the 562R-1E rol l  
computer components of the FD-109 system. Steering commands w e r e  
presented via an integrated pitch and roll command bar, Both the steer' 'g 
commands and the expanded-scale displaj. of localizer deviation available 
on the Flight Director Indicator (FCI) were scaled as a function of glide 
slope and localizer deviation inputs. A full-scale deflection (one dot) 
on the expanded localizer deviation indicator corresponded to s 20 micro- 
amp deviation signal from the localizer receiver. The steering computer 
w a s  also designed to automatically change the glide slops inpul gain 
when activated by a preset radio altitude trip point. 
set at 203 feet. A t  this altitude, tie gain for pitch steering commands 
w a s  reduced to half the rr Yninal value oter a 7.5 second period. 
The trip point was  
Radio altitude w a s  aerived in the simulation computer by summing 
2 and the programmed values of terrain elevation. The three alternate 
approach terrain profiles (see Figure 3) were programmed on diode 
function generators as functions of X to represent the variations in this 
environmental condition. 
w a s  provided by a comparator matching the radio aJtitude signal with a 
preset voltage representing the MDA, i. e. , the vclue which correspdnds 
to a 2 of 100 feet at the Inner Marker .  
w a s  different for each of the terrain profiles iifsed in the problem. 
A minimum decision altitude (MDA) trip signal 
This preset MDA reference value 
31 
The MDA trip signal w a s  w e d  to illuminate the MDA light on the 
Flight Director Indicator. Ano thc  MDA trip signal was  generated by 
comparing the radio altitude signal to a preset signal representing an 
altitude which w a s  50 feet higher than the MDA. This second trip signal 
w a s  used to initiate an audio tone warning applied to the pilot's 
set. Onset of the tone thus occurred at 50 feet above the preset altitude, 
increased in vohme as the aircraft descended, and terminated abruptly 
when the MDA trip signal was generated, 
head- 
Data Recc -ding Equipment 
Objective recording of flight situation data and pilot response 
events for the subsequent assessment and interpretation of flight manage- 
ment cask performance was accomplished by utilizing the SEL 840 Digital 
Computer System and two s t r ip  chart recorders. In order to record 
subject response events, the following controls and/or control design 
features were  added to the pilot's station (see Figure 5): 
1. A momentary contact type pushbutton, labelled RA for 
Relative Altitude, was  located on the front of the inboard 
horn of the control wheel 0. A discrete voltage level 
change occurred each time this button was depressed. 
2. A discrete voltage levcl change occurred as the AFCS was 
disengaged. The AFCS DISENGAGE (AD) button was located 
on the inside of the outboard horn of the control w h e e a .  
The parameters and events recorded on the strip chart recorders 
are identified in Tables 3 and 4. Eight channels of data were 
monitored by the SEL 840 Digital Computer System. During the execu- 
tion of an experimental run the outputs of the analog-to-digital converters 
were  sampled to detect flight situation and pilot response events. As 
these events occurred the values of selected channels w e r e  stored into 
computer memory for subsequent e r r o r  calculation and recording onto 
disc storage system, 
identified in  Table 5. 
The data monitored by the 840 system a re  
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At the conclusion of a run sequence, the pilot's estimates were 
entered manually into thc computer memory via the ASR-33 teletype 
terminal. Error scores based on the pilot's estimates and recorded 
data values were then calculated and a run summary printout provided 
through the teletype terminal. To prevent loss of information, data 
stored on the disc storage system were periodically transferred to 
aagnetic tape. This magnetic tape was then used at the end of the study 
as the source of data for analysis. 
Procedure 
The study was carried out by having twelve Category 11-qualified 
airline pilots fly a total of 252 approach and landing sequences in the 
simulator for the record. A complete run schedule for each pilot in- 
cluded three simulator-familiarization runs, conducted under clear 
visibility conditions and with no experimental tasks assigned, to give 
them the "feel" of the device and the simulated instrumentation. Six 
practice runs were then completed under the conditione appropriate to 
the pilot's role in the experiment to allow him to learn the assigned 
experimental taeks and to practice landing maneuvers under the 1200- 
and 16OO-?oot RVR conditions. Eight pilots then flew twenty-seven runs 
for record and four flew nine runs as described in the experimental de- 
sign section. 
A standardized orientation was given to each pilot. Each pilot 
read a booklet (see Appendix B) describing his role in the simulation 
exercise, the principal characteristics of the simulation sequence, and 
the equipment, and the specific experimental tasks they would be asked 
to perform. An Experimenter provided amplifying comments and briefed 
the pilots on the procedures to be followed in the eimulator. Background 
data was taken on the pilots at this time. 
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A f t e r  completing the orientation session, pilots were taken 
to the simulator crew compartment and briefed on the location and 
operation of all controls and displays they would use  during the scheduled 
run series. 
tion runs to familiarize the pilots 
and the correct performance of the experimental tasks. The pilot was 
then seated and allowed to complete three familiarization runs. 
The Experimenter then flew two "talk-through" demonstra- 
with the general sequence of events 
Pr ior  to initiating the practice run series, the simulator w a s  posi- 
tioned at the Inner Marker and then placed successivelj in six different 
lateral and vertical offset positions. Visibility was reduced to simulate 
1200- and 1600-foot RVR at the other three. Pilots were thereby given a 
static demonstration of how the variations in flight path offset they would 
encounter later in the dynamic sequence would appear under the Category 
I1 visibility conditions represented in the simulation. The simulator was  
then repositioned and set-up for  initial run conditions and the practice 
run series w a s  completed. 
Experimental runs w e r e  completed in blocks of nine-run series, 
as called for by the experimental design. The longest run schedules 
required approximately 3 hours to complete. A lunch break was scheduled 
after the first hour and pilots were  allowea to fly two refresher runs prior 
to completing the afternoon schedule. In a debriefing session following the 
simulator run series, an open-ended interview was  conddcted, using a 
questionnaire form (see Appendix C). 
to comment on their experience and to express their opinions regarding 
the operational procedures, flight instrumentation and control techniques 
represented in the simulation. 
This procedure allowed the pilots 
Pilots 
Fifteen currently active, senior airline pilots participated a s  sub- 
Most of the pilots (9) were flying with Pan American, jects in the study. 
4 were with Trans World Airlines, and 2 were with United Airlines. Two 
of these pilots f l e w  the simulator during simulator checkout and proccdure 
verification exercises and 12 f lew for the record. The last pilot was 
Serendipity inc. 
Captain R.. H. Beck, I F A L P A  committee chairman for A l l  Weather 
Operations and author of many papers on the pilot's role in redwed 
minima operations. He w a s  invited to experience the simulation exer- 
cise and to critique the study. The contributions of these pilots is hereby 
gratefully acknowledged. 
A l l  of the 12 pilots who flew for the record were  Captains and 
had completed their company's training pragram and certification re- 
quirements for  Category 11 operations. Four of the pilots were  
company check pilots and training Captains and two were  .chairmen of 
the local ALPA Councils for their airlines. The average pilot was 47 
years  old and had 16,425 hours of ic-ci;; airline flying; 6,875 of these hours 
were  in jet transports. With the exception of three pilots who had served 
for many years  as Navigators and subsequently <udi€ied as pilots, the 
average number years  of command pilot experience represented was 
fourteen years. 
Experimental Design 
The design of the study is best understood as a composite structure 
comprised of three separate and distinguishable component experiments 
which w e r e  all carried out within the context of the same set  of simu- 
lated approach and landing sequences. Its basic structure, as  schematized 
ear l ier  in Figure 1, was  simply a testing sequence wherein the twelve 
pilots were exposed to controlled variations in aircraft behavior and 
data w a s  taken on their performance of specified flight management tasks, 
A l l  of the runs in this test se r ies  were made under the same baseline 
conditions of information availability and display, operational procedure, 
and control task loading. 
The testing sequence can be seen as  the f i rs t  component of the study. 
Performance data obtained on elements of the approach success judgment 
w e r e  interpreted with reference to external criteria of accuracy, time- 
liness, appropriateness, etc, For example, the accuracy of lateral offset 
judgments was assessed by comparing pilot estimates of this parameter 
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value with the "actual1' position of the aircraf t  at selected points ilr the 
simulation sequence. 
over a l l  controlled variations in 
The average magnitude and variability of these 
e r ror"  scores, taken on all pilots I 1  
flight path and environmental conditions, was interpreted with regard to 
the practical significance of e r ro r s  a s  great as those reflected in the 
data and/or the proportion of runs on which e r r o r s  in judgment were 
indicated. 
The second component in the composite design w a s  the iterations of 
the test  series which w e r e  carried oct in order to examine the effects of 
differences in c r e w  procedures and control task loading on flight manage- 
ment task performance. This examination called for  a statistical assess- 
ment of differences in flight 'management performance under alternative 
conditions. Including baseline conditions, three alternate operational 
procedures and three alternate control task loadings were  distinguished, 
as outlined below, to define the levels of these experimental variables. 
&erational Procedure: 
1. Cross-check - Under this condition, experimental tasks were 
initially performed solely by instrument reference. A s  the 
aircraft  approached the anticipated breakout altitude, and at 
his discretion, the pilot was  permitted to  look out to see 
if the runway or approach lights were visible. .As visual 
cues beccme available, the. pilot could replace o r  supple- 
ment information obtained by instrument reference with 
information from the external visual field. The frequency 
and duratiori of shifts ir, visual reference were at the 
pilot's discretion. Full control authority was  retained by 
the pilot throughout the approach and landing sequence. 
2. Head-down - - Under this procedure, the pilot was  
instructed to perform assigned experimental tasks solely by 
instrument reference al l  the way to the decision height and 
to rely on the Experimenter,acting as  F i rs t  Officer, to 
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monitor external visual conditions. As a matter of disciphue 
in operating procedure, the pilot was constrained not to 
look up for  visual cues until he determined that tne aircraft 
was at the 100-foot DH. At that time, the pilot was instructed 
to assume manual control and execute the landing maneuver 
by visual refeyence. 
3. Head-up - Under this procedure, control authority w a s  
assumed to be assigned to  the First Officer and the subject- 
pilot concerned himself exclusively with managing the approach. 
In the operational situation, the First Officer would remain 
head down to closely monitor autopilot performance or 
exercise manual control. A t  200 feet above the runway, 
the pilot was therefore free to go head-up and to direct 
his full attention to the search for visual cues. Under 
this condition, then, all flight path a l ipmen t  judgments made 
in the vicinity of the DH were made strictly by visual reference. 
Arrival ai the DH was indicated by tone offset and the illu- 
mination of the MDA light. When this event occurred, the 
pilot 
completed the landing by external visual reference. 
disengaged'the automatic control system and 
Control Task Loading: 
1. Fully Automatic - For  this control mode the Automatic Flight 
Control System (AFCS) was placed in the AUTO mode to repre-  
sent automatic tracking of both the glide slope and localizer 
beams. In this mode, the programmed flight profiles governed 
the aircraft 's  flight path (see Table 1 for definition of these 
profiles) . 
2. Split Axis - In this mode, the AFCS was  engaged in the roll  
axis only and localizer tracking was  automatic. Vertical flight 
path control (pitch axis) w a s  concurrently exercised manually 
by the pilot. 
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GROUP 2 
(n=4) GROUP 2 
3. Fully Manual - In this mode, the AFCS w a s  disengaged and 
both horizontal and vertical flight path control was  manual. 
GROUP 2 
A two-by-three factorial design with repeated measures on one 
factor (ref.6, p. 298) w a s  adopted for carrying out this seconj  component 
of the experiment and also served to establish the detailed D a s h  for 
scheduling pilot exposure to run variations and experiments1 conditions 
for all components of the study. This design is schematized in Figure 7. 
FACTOR B 
CONTROL TASK LOADING 
FACTOR A 
OPERATIONAL 
PROCEDURE 
AI 
(CROSS-CHECK) 
(FULLY 
GROUP I 
b=4) GROUP I GROUP I 
I I 
1------1 
I . (n=4) 
---Io- 
I GROUP3 I A3 I (see text for explanation of Group 3 ) 
(HEAD -UP) I  
Using this design, comparisons between different levels of Factor A 
a re  confounded with differences between groups of pilots. 
the effects of F w t o r  B and of interactions between A and B 
However, 
are free 
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of this confounding 2nd the teets of these effects 
than those on the effects of A, The eight pilots required to carry out 
this design were  randomly assigned to two experimental groups com- 
prised of four pilots each. The four pilots in Group 1, using the 
under condition bl, nine more under condition b2, and, finally, nine 
runs under condition bg. Group 2 completed the same run series using 
the "Head-down" procedure, Four additional pilots were  assigned 
to a third Group and completed only nine runs under a condition defined 
by pairing the "Head-up" procedure with the "Fully Automatic'' control 
mode. In the baseline landing system (with no head-up display) the 
Head-up" procedure can be used only when the Captain is relieved of 
the manual flight control task in both axes, either by the autopilot o r  the 
First Officer; combining this operational procedure with split-axis or 
full manual control would, therefore, be meaningless., 
are more sensitive 
Cross-check" procedure, completed nine approach and landing sequmces I t  
I 1  
The third experiment in the composite design was directed toward 
the problem of establishing appropriate lateral offset limits at the lOO-foo+ 
decision height and tr, the issue of relating variations in the vertical flight 
situation to touchdown performance relative to longitudinal dispersion 
limits (Appendix A, pp. A-8 and A-16). As a consequence of exercising 
control over the flight paths followed by the simulated aircraft on most 
of the runs conducted for purposes of study components one and two, 
an examination of toxhdown performance associated with a wide range 
of terminal conditions (i. e., vertical offset, lateral offset, and tracking 
vector at the decision height) w a s  possible. Pilots were instructed to 
attempt the landing maneuver on all runs, even those on which terminal 
offset conditione w e r e  considered excessi.ve. For  purposes of the experi- 
ment, pilots were  further instructed not to  compromise on desired 
touchdown rate-of-descent in attempts to assure touchdown within estab- 
lished longitudinal limits nor to use control techniques that could not be 
used routinely under actual Category I1 flight conditions (e. g., the 
duck-under" maneuver o r  the use of excessive roil rates and/or bank 
angles) . 
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With respect to the lateral offset limit problem, this third experiment 
can be seen as a parametric study of the pilot's ability and willingness 
to execute the side-step maneuver from various lateral offset positions 
at the decision height, 
Schedule of Pilot's Exposure to Run Variations and Experimental Conditions 
The twelve pilots available for  the simulation study were randomly 
assigned to three experimental groups. Membership in a group determined 
the operational procedure to be used by a given pilot on all runs, Group 
1 used the "Cross-check" procedure, Group 2 was "Head-down", and Group 
3 was "Head-up". The order in which pilots in Groups 1 and 2 were  
exp 5 .d to different levels of Control Task Loading was counterbalanced 
so that differences in performance would not be systematically biased by 
carry-over effects. These effects include such factors as fatigue and learn- 
ing which may occur as earlier runs in a series dre completed and "carry- 
over" to affect performance on subsequent runs. 
The order of exposure to levels of Factor B w t s  as indicated below 
for  pilots in both Group 1 and Group 2 : 
Firs t  Series Second Series Third Series 
b3 b2 
44 
Eat . es consisted of nine approach and landing sequences 
(runs). f ~ t . 4 -  : xtically controlle 
bl and t2 (see Figure 7) and the same 
file and environmental conditions was  applied on all run series. Variatioilc 
in flight path and environmental conditions were  combir.ed to deiine nine 
basic run c mdition al+erimtives. 
for  each run. Definitions for these alternatives, designated A l ,  A2, A3,. . . 
A9, a r e  given in Table 6 by specifying the approach profile, terrain profile, 
and RVR used on a derignated Fin. 
Xight paths were  used under conditions 
of variations in flight pro- 
One of these alternatives was specified 
Table 6. Definition of Altermtive Run Conditions 
AI  krm five 
Designa tor 
c -  
A 2  
A 3  
A 4  
A S  
A 6  
A 7  
A 8  
A 9  
Approach 
Profile * 
P-l 
P-2 
P 4  
P - 4  
P-5 
P-6 
P-7 
P-8 
P-9 
Termin 
Profile ** 
TP-1 
TP-2 
T P 3  
TP-1 
TP-2 
T P 3  
TP-I 
TP-2 
TP-3 
RVR 
m. 1 
1200 
1600 
1200 
16ChJ 
1200 
la00 
1600 
1200 
NOTES: * Approach profiles are & h e d  in Table 1, 
** Terrain profiles are defined in Figu; e 4. 
To fwthz-. counterbalance ca r ry -mer  effects and to  preclude pilot 
detection of .c,lninonalities in the flight situations he is exposed to from 
run to run. the order of pilot exposure to run alternatives was ran- 
domized. A table sI random numbers was used to generate the twelve 
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run patterns given in Table 7. Cell entries identify the run condition 
alternative, as defined in  Table 6, selected for each run in a series of 
nine rum. The run pattern adopted for a particular series thus establish 
the order in which these alternatives were presented. 
Table 7. Random Patterns of Run Alternatives 
pattern 
Designa tor 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
Order of Presentation in a Given Series 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
4 
5 
a 
6 
5 
6 
5 
2 
8 
2 
6 
4 
9 
6 
4 
2 
3 
5 
7 
4 
3 
5 
2 
5 
6 
7 
2 
4 
4 
1 
2 
5 
2 
1 
5 
3 
8 
4 
5 
7 
6 
7 
9 
3 
4 
6 
9 
7 
1 
0 
7 
3 
2 
9 
6 
9 
3 
3 
7 
6 
5 
9 
1 
1 
7 
2 
8 
6 
6 
4 
1 
1 
7 
2 
3 
8 
f3 
8 
4 
8 
7 
7 
3 
2 
2 
3 
9 
5 
9 
3 
3 
7 
1 
9 
4 
9 
3 
1 
6 
9 
1 
4 
1 
1 
5 
8 
8 
8 
_-  The foregoing considerations were used to  fully structure the study 
i n  te rms  of the total number of simulator runs required, pilot assign- 
ments to particular run series, and the flight situation to be represented 
on each rm. Each of the  eight pilots in Groups 1 and 2 flew 36 runs; 
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nine familiarization practice runs and 27 for  record. Pilots in Group 
3 flew 18 runs; nine preliminary and nine for record. The total num- 
ber  of runs was &us 360, of which 252 provided the data used in the 
analysis and interpretation of results. 
Data Recording and Analysis for Assessing 
Flight Management Task Performancc 
The basic structure of the simulation exercise, as indicate(, earlier, 
was a straightforward testing sequence designed to determke how wel l  
the pilots could perform the component tasks of the approach surcess  
judgment under the conditions represented in the simulation. One 
sub;et of these conditions is intended to be taken as the most likely 
cor dit ions for actual Category 11 approach and landing operations and is 
defined by pairing the "Fully Automatic" flight control mode with the 
Head-down" operatio,ial procedure. Data taken on simulator runs 
carried out under these conditions is therefore used as the basis for  
deriving the best estimates of command pilot performance during actual 
flight operations. 
I 1  
Thirty six approach and landing sequences were  flown under the 
nominal Category PI conditions; the f m l r  pilgts assigned to this condition 
each flew a series of nine runs for  the record. Flight situation and 
pilot response data were  recorded on each run to provide the basis for 
deriving criterion measures of flight management task performance 
for each comaonent of the approach success judgment. The measures 
adopted and their derivation from recorded run data a re  briefly defined 
below. 
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Evaluation of Pilot's Ability to Estimate Relative Altitude 
The measure selected for this assessi.ient was the number of e r r o r s  
P i 10 t s made in estimating their actual height above the runway touchdown 
zone. Response indicators of pilot estimates of this parameter (2) wereob- 
tainedat three points ir the approach: one at 300 feet (designated as e2), 
one at 200 feet (designatcd as eg), and the last one at the  100 foot decision 
height (designated as e4). When the Pilot was confident that the aircraft 
was  at precisely F30 feet (and later at 200 feet), he depressed and released 
the rdA (relative altitclde) button. When 5e was  cozfident that the aircraft 
was precisely 1 C 3  feet above the runway (i. e., at the DH), he depressed 
and released the AFCS DISENGAGE (AD) button. Activation of these push- 
buttons was ser  se4 by the 840 computer and the actual value of 2 at the time 
of these events wds determined for  subsequent print-out and derivation of 
e r r o r  scores. Activation of the RA and AD buttons was also recorded on the 
s t r ip  chart recorders 2nd could be compared with corresponding recorde: 
values of 2. 
The value of 2 at the time the 9ilot depressed the designated 
pushbuttons (Zest 
Since the operational sigrrificani e of a precise determination of 2 increases 
as the aircraft approaches the DH, different accuracy limits were  csed to 
define e2, e3, and e4. A t  300 feet an e2 e r r o r  was counted whenever 
was recorded and then used to derive e r r o r  counts. 
I I I > 50 feet, a n  e3  e r r o r  was  counted when 2 - Zestel > 20 feet, 
I '  
12 - Zest. 
and at the DH an e4 errclr '.vas counted whenever Z - Zest. I > 12 feet. 
P i l o t  performance on this component of the approach sucdess judgment is 
reflected in summary statistics on Zest. data and by e r r o r  ratios formed by 
dividing e2, e3 and e4 errm counts by the number of runs in a series or  
subset of interest. 
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Evaluation of Pilot's Ability to Estimate Lateral Offset and Tracking 
Vectors 
Absolute errors in the pilot's quantitative estimates of the 
aircraft's lateral displacement from the extended runway centerline, 
taken at the time he depressed the AD button, were  the criterion 
measures ussd to evaluate lateral offset judgments. Errors  in the 
p i l o t  ' s qualitative estimates of aircraft tracking tendencies at the 
same point in the approach were used to assess the tracking judgment. 
P i l o t  s were instructed to report quantitative estimates of the aircraft's 
lateral offset from the extended runway centerline (Y) verbally, via the 
intercom system, and these estimates were recorded, as reported, by 
the experimenter. After subsewent entry into the 840 computer Y 
estimates were  compared with actualvalues of Y at the time the 
depressed the AD button in order to derive the e r ro r  measures. 
" h i l y  Manual" runs, the same data was  obtained from values of Y 
recorded when the computer sensed the p i 1 o t s depression of the RA 
button in the vicinity of the 100 foot DH. 
On 
At the time p i 1 o t  s reported Y estimates at the DH, they included 
in their transmission a qualitative estimate of the alignment of the air- 
craft's direction of flight Over the ground with the extended runway center- 
line. P i l o t  s were instructed to report ". . . . . tracking ON (or PARAL- 
LEL)", when no significant misalignment was perceived; 
DIVERGING", when the aircraft was  judged to be moving away from 
t l  . . . . . track 
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When the subjeck report was: 
"ON" or "PAWL LEL" 
" DIVERG I NG I' 
I' CO NVE RG I NG " 
the azsired track; or  ' I.. . . . track CONVERGING", when the aircraft 
was judged to be moving toward the  desired track. 
- 
And the recorded value of Y was: 
e 4 fps - 4 fps I 
e9 error no error 
e9 error no error* 
eg error no error* 
Erro r  measures, designated as e? er rors ,  for p i l o t  estimates 
of lateral offset a r e  based on the absolute value of the difference between 
the actual value of Y and the p i  l o t  s Y estimates; an e7 e r r o r  was 
counted whenever I Y - Yest. I > 25 feet. Subject performance on this 
component of the approach success judgment is thus reflected in sum- 
mary statistics on I Y  - Yest ,  i data and by e r r o r  ratios formed by 
dividing e7 e r r o r  counts by the total number of runs in a designated 
ser ies  or  subset. 
P i l o t  e r r o r s  in judging the aircraft% tracking tendencies 
were  determi .ed by comparing his verbal qualitative estimates, which 
were  recorded on the experimenter's data sheet, with cross-track 
velocities (?\ recorded at the time these estimates were made, i. e., 
when the AL' button was depressed. Errors ,  designated as eg, were 
counted in accordance with the following tlaccu:'acj 'I matrix: 
*If direction is correct; i . e . ,  away from track when DIVERGING 
i s  reported, toward track when CONVERGING i s  reported. 
fcr 2 errors were used to represent p i l o t  performance 9 Erl:p 
01 . ;r r' 1 t of the approach success judgment. 
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Evaluation of p i 1 o t s Ability to Predict Approach Success 
Thia assessment was concerned with the p i l o  t s ability to extra- 
polate his ongoing determination of the aircraft 's  flight path to the terminal 
conditions of the approach. It was included as  a general test of the extent 
to which baseline flight instrumentation enabled the pilot to accurately 
judge whether or  not he would arrive at the DH within specified flight path 
offset limits. 
The measure selected for this test w a s  the number of e r ro r s  pilots 
mads in predicting that the aircraft  would be within or  oiltside prescribed 
offset limits on arrival at the DH. P i l o t  s were  instructed to attempt 
this prediction just  after making their first estimate of height above 
touchdown at 300 feet. The prediction was given verbally, using the 
intercom system, and reflected the p i l o t  ' s go/no-go judgment that the 
aircraft would be within 50 feet of the extended runway centerline and not 
more than 12 feet above or  below the 100-foot DH on arr ival  at the Inner 
Marker. This report was recorded by the Experimenter and relayed to 
the data monitor who subsequently entered the data into the 840 Data Ac- 
quisition System. 
a "Within" prediction was  reported and actual offsets exceeded either of 
the limits o r  when an "Outside" report was  given and actual offsets were  
within both limits. 
Er rors ,  designated e5 er rors ,  were  counted whenever 
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Data Treatment for Assessing the Effects of 
Operational Procedure and Control Task Loading 
Summary statistics on the measures =>f ;light management task 
performance under alternative o p e r a i i a G  PI'. ,edures and control task 
loading w e r e  also derived for contrast with those obtained under the more 
representative operational conditions. k, addition, the joint and separate 
effects of the variations in Operational Procedure (Factor A) and Control 
Task Loading (Factor B) were  examined by analysis of variance techniques. 
The structural  model underlying the basic factorial design and the corres- 
ponding computational procedures used for the analysis are discussed 
in Winer (ref. 6 , p. 298). When the variance analysis indicated signifi- 
cant overall effects for one or both of these variables, the Newman-Keuls 
method (ref. 6, p. 80j was used to test the differe-xes between particular 
levels of the two factors. 
Contrasts between performance under the "Head-up" condition and 
The performance of the 
the conditions included in the basic- factorial arrangement w e r e  carried 
out by using appropriate t tests (ref. 6, p. 24). 
4 p i l o  t s assigned to Group 3 could be contrasted with that of 4 different 
p 110 t s in Group 1 or  2 under the treatment combinations of interest. 
In addition to certain of the measures already identified for  com- 
ponents of the approach success judgment, a composite measure of the 
overall quality of p i i o t pertormance w a s  defined for the examination 
of the effects of alternative procedures and control task loading. This 
measure was  a weighted sum of the e2, e3,  e4, e5, e,, and e e r r o r s  
defined in the preceding section. The differential weighting of these 
e r r o r  scores reflects the operational importance attributed to the 
correspmding judgments. 
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E r r o r s  in estimating relative altitude (e,) and lateral  offset (e,) 
at the decision height were considered most cri t ical  and were assigned a 
weighting value of 3. E r r o r s  in judging tracking vectors at the decision 
5 3  
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height (e ) and in estimating relative altitude at 200 feet (e,) were con- 
sidered somewhat less critical and w e r e  assigned a value of 2. 
remaining e r r o r  types included the relative altitude estimate 
earlier in the approach (e,) and the decision height prediction (e 5 ). 
These e r r o r s  are considered to be comparatively less crit ical  and 
w e r e  assigned a weighting value of 1. 
9 
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Data Treatment for  Evaluating the Effects of 
Flight Pqth Offset at the Decision Height (DH) on Landing Performance 
This assessment was  concerned with the pilot's willingness and 
ability to execute the landing manecver from various flight path offset 
positions and tracking vectors at the DH. By combining 3 lateral off- 
set  situations with 2 tracking conditions and-3 vertical offsets, 18 
different terminal situations were  defined and touchdown performance 
was considered for each of these DH situations. 
ness to complete the landing maneuver from each of the DH situations 
was indicated by his verbal report, recorded by the Experimenter, af 
his acceptance of the offset and tracking situation actually encountered 
at the DH on each run. Since the p i 1 o t s were instructed to attempt a 
landing out of each approach, their ability to effect a successful touch- 
down was determined for each of the terminal .:onditions of interest by 
obtaining data on touchdown position and velocities. 
The p i l o  t s willing- 
The measures selected for assessing touchdown performance were 
lateral touchdown position (Y ), longitudinal touchdown position (X), 
vertical velocity (A), and cross-track velocity (?) at touchdown. 
toLchdwil'n dispersion limits (ref. 
touchdown positions. 
whenever the recorded value of Y w a s  greater than - +27 feet. 
along the runway w a s  acceptable only when the recorded value of X at 
touchdow,: w a s  within +lo00 and -1500 feet. 
FAA 
) were used to assess recorded 
Lateral displacement was considered excessive 
Touchdown 
Since X=O occurs at the 
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glideslope intersection with the runway (GSX), the actual runway threshold 
is defined by X = 1,000 feet. A touchdown at greater positive values of X 
would therefore constitute a short landing. An X value of -2,000 feet 
corresponds to the end of the 3,000-foot touchdown zone. Assuming a 
restruction in the pilot's forward visibility of q.pproximately 25 feet in 
front of the aircraft when it is in the landing attitude, a main gear touch- 
down at or before the point X = -1,500 feet was required to stay within 
longitudinal tc ichdown dispersion limits. These limits would assure a 
main gear touchdown point that will  enable the pilot ". . . . to see at least 
four bars (on 100-foot centers) of the 3,000-foot touchdown zone lights at 
touchdown" (ref, 7). These dispersion limits a re  illustrated in Figure 8. 
Threshold (X=lOOO') End of Touchdown Zone r (X=-2000') 
0' 1000' 2000' 
(Feet from Threshold) I 
3000 ' 
1 Longitudinal Dispersion Limits t- (0' C X 2750') 
Figure 8. Touchdown Dispersion Limits Used to Assess Landing Performance. 
Criterion values used for assessing touchdown velocities were  six 
feet per second for 6 and eight feet per second for ?. Landings were con- 
sidered to be completely successful only when recorded touchdown velocities 
were k ?low these values. 

Data reflecting pilot performance on the asaig~ed experimental 
tasks are preeented in this section, Anaiyses of the effects of control 
task loading and operatianal procedure on flight management task per- 
formance a id  data reflecting the pilot willingness and ability to 
execute the landing mmeuver from various flight path offset situations 
at the decision height are also reported here. The presentation of these 
data is structured by the specific isaues and questions raised in the 
analysis underlying the asirnulation study. 
Each of these issues will be briefly restated and a summary statement 
of the stud;? remlts pertinent to that issue is given. &upporting data is 
then cited and diacussed in tesmti: of its relevance to the issuee of interest 
and of its statistical and practical significance. A complete record of 
error scose8, p i  t o t  estimatea of specified flight situation parameters, 
and the recorded values of them parameters at key points in the approach 
and landing sequence is prefilented in Apgeudix D. 
FLght Management Task Performance 
The general intent of the simulation study wae to exercise appro- 
priately qualified pilots in the performance of selected approach 
a#sessment tasks under nominal Category rlI operating conditions and to 
obtain data on how we21 they are Eiupported in the performance of these 
tasks by the information availability and flight deck dirvplay characteristic8 
assumed for the basehe low visibility landing system & V U ) ,  Data 
recorded auring the airnulator run5 provides an estimate of the number and 
type of errors in pilot judgment which may be expected to Q C C U ~  in aciual 
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flight operations under the conditions represent, d. 
Operationally significant e r ro r s  occurred on more than a third 
of these runs in the present study. With respect to the support provided 
Lo the command pilot for flight management activities, this general 
finding indicates inadequacies in the LVLS design features and/or opera- 
tional pi-ocedures assumed in the underlying analysis. A breakdown of 
p i l o  t task performance data for specific elements of the approach 
success judgment follows . 
Pilot Estimates of Height Above Touchdown 
The analysis underlying the study questioned the pjlot's ability to 
accurately estimate relative altitude, i. e. , the aircraft's height relative 
to the intended touchdown point on the runway, as the aircraft approaches 
the authorized minimum decision altitude (Appendix * , b. A-4). Irregu- 
larities in terrcin elevation approaching the runway were cited as a major 
factor in the d'fficultiee anticipated for the pilot in judging his arrival 
at the 100 foot c'ecision height (DH). 
Data taken under the most representative operational conditions 
included in the simulation indicate that significant e r ro r s  in judging 
arrival at the DH wil l  occur on 36% af the approaches. Variations in 
terrain profile were found to have 2 significant adver.x effect 03 these 
judgments. When irregularities in terrain elevations apprroaching 
the runway were represented in tile simulator, e r r o r s  in judging ai-ival 
at the DH occurred on more than half of the runs. 
Summary 4ata on pilot estjmates of height auove touchdown 
(HAT) for the major variations in operational conditiom represented in 
the simulator a re  presented i.1 Table 8 .  A s  indicated earlier, the ''Fully 
Automatic" control mode paired with trle "Head DOW~:' procedure is Consi- 
dered to be rr.ost representative of operational conditiom. 
on the 36 ?~-uns under these conditions (Cohmrh 2) may thus be interpretc 
as the best estimators of pilot performance in the Gperational situation. 
Data taken 
58 
e r: 
ii B a 
e 
f 
t - 
* c
t 
0 a. 
.- 
e 
2 
-t 
t 
0 
c 
5 
0 
0 
-E 
2 
B 
h 
c 
e 
U 
2 
OD 
b b  
VD 
c 
0 
e 
E 
0 .- 
c VD 
L u  
c 
0 -
6 
% 
0 
x 
V s 
Y 
V 
ao' 
9) 
9 
0 c 
-
t 
2 
Y 
0 
a 3
C - 
i 3) 
s 
f 
4 A b  
It n It It 
It is of interest to note that p i l o  t performance under these conditions 
was consistently better thcn under any alternative condition. 
Mean p i l o  t estimates of HAT, in .*lost instances, were quite close 
to the actual values at all three altitudes. The variability of these estimates, 
however, is very high, as indicated by the corresponding standard deviations. 
Er ro r  ratios iE/R) are reported in Table 8 to  provide an indication of the 
operational significance of this variability in p i l o t  performance. These 
ratios werc formed by dividing the e r r o r  count for a specified run series by 
t!! tots!. ntur;ber of runs (a run is one approach and landing sequence in the 
simulator ). 
At 300 feet an errw was counted when the P i l o t  ' s estimate was not 
within 50 feet of this value. In almobt all instances, the variability in 300- 
foot Estimates was within these limits. As the aircraft approaches the deci- 
sion height, more accurate judgments are required; at 200 feet a one-dot 
deflection on the glideslope deviation indicator represents 28 feet above o r  
below the glideslope and at the l O O f o o t  decision height the one-dot displace- 
ment is only 14 feet. Accordingly, e r r o r s  in the 2OOIfoot estimate were 
counted when estimates were  more than 20 feet off and e r r o r s  in estimating 
the 1OOfoot p i n t  were counted when estimates were more than 12 feet off. 
Further justification for adopting the 12foat accuracy limits for the DH judg- 
, ment is prm-ided by the FAA requirement that glideslope tracking be accompli-:led 
i ' I.. . to within - +35 microamperes or - +12 feet, whichever is larger" ( ref. 7)  
t 
The effect of varying approach terrain elevation profiles on HAT estimates 
at the DH is shown in Table 9 (see the Method section for a definition of the 
terrain profiles). Data from 210 simulator runs were  reorganized to separate 
runs on the basis of the terrain profile represented. The slight departure 
from the experimental plan, which called for 72 runs under each terrain pro- 
file, is due to missing data. On six of the fully manual runs, p i l o t  s forgot 
to indicate arrival at the 1004oot point. Variability in p i l o t s  and other run 
conditions was the 8ame for the three sets of data summarized in Table 9. 
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Tabk 9, Effect of Approach Termin Elevations on Pilot Judgments of Arrival 
at the IOO-Foot Decision Height. 
kasure  I 
k n  P estimate - feet 
(Number of observations) 
Standard deviation 
Total emrs 
hat ratio 
108 
(69) 
27 
41 
059 
98 
11 
12 
17 
VO) 
114 
20 
37 
.52 
(71 1 
It is clear from the summary data that, in contrast with the "Level" 
profile, both the variability of p i lo t estimates and the number of significant 
e r r o r s  increased when either the "High" or  the "Low" profile was  represented. 
An analysis of variance, based cn a rearrangement of the data in accordance 
with a single factor design with repeated measures (ref. 6, p. 1051, shows 
the effect of differences in terrain profile on the error ratios to be significant 
when a is set at . 01. A summary of this malysis is presented in Table 10. 
Table IO. Analysis of Variance for Termin Profile Effects. 
I Source of Variation 
Between pi lots 
Within pilots 
Terrain profile 
Residua I 
Toto I 
7 
16 
2 
14 
,23 
0425 
0039 
IO, 89** 
E l  
A test of the differences between error ratios for the three terrain 
profiles, using the Newman-Keuls method (ref. 6, p. 801, indicates that 
e r r o r  ratios for both the "Low" and "High" profiles differ significantly from 
those for the "Levell' profile ( a =. 01). 
for the ItLow" and "High" profiles a r e  not significant. 
Differences between error. ratios 
Summary data preser,:ed in TG51e 8 for alternative run conditions 
reflects higher error ratios and thus provides further support for the 
assertion that difficulties may be expected in judging relative altitude. 
Variations in operational procedure do not affect the estimates made prior 
to the emergence af visual cues at 300 and 200 feet. 
loading in going from "Fully Automatic" runs to the manual control modes 
was expected to  increase e r r o r  scores or  variability in HAT estimates, but 
the data do not support this contention. An analysis of variance on e r r o r  
ratio data, arranged in a 2 x 3 factorial design with repeated measures 
(ref. 6, p. 302) revealed no sigr.ificant effects of either control mode, 
operational procedures, or the interaction of these two variables on the 
critical estimate of arrival at the DH. 
The increased task 
Based on the data obtained in the simulator, pilot estimates of rela- 
tive altitude can be expected to be highly variable (and therefore unreliable) 
and to be adversely affected to a marked degree by variations in approach 
terrain elevations. In the debriefing session followinfi +he simulation exercise, 
pilots identified the information sources for their HAT estimates. Six 
of the twelve pilots used both the BarorrLetl-ic and Radio altimeter for the 
300-foot estimate, five pilots reported exclusive use of the Radio Altimeter, 
and one pilot relied solely on the Barometric instrument. At 200 feet, less 
use of the Barometric Altimeter w a s  reported. At the DH all twelve pilots 
used the Radio Altimeter. Six used this instrument exclusively, five used 
it together with the auditory tone, and one used it in conpnction with the 
Barometric Altimeter. It is interesting to note that none of the pilots r e -  
ported i sing the Minimum Decision Altitude (MDA) light located on the 
Flight Director Indicator. 
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Inspection of the e r r o r  scores for  individual pilots revealed no 
systemat::: differences which might be attributal to the information 
source used. Consistent use of either the auditory tone or  MDA light 
should have minimized the effects of variations in terrain profile, but 
there was  no indication of this in the data. Consideration was given to the 
possible effects of deiayed pilot reaction times on HAT estimates. 
However, this factor would tend to produce pilot estimates which 
w e r e  lower than the altitudes being judged and the mean pilot estimates 
reported in Table 8, with only three exc Itions, a re  consistantly higher 
than the target values. Reaction time is therefore dismissed as a 
biasing factor. 
Responses to the debriefing questionnaire show that only two of 
the tweleve p i lo t s  fotlnd the use of the pushbutton to be awkward or 
o r  limiting for indicating HAT estimates. Four pilots rqmrted some 
awkwardr-ess on the first few runs but no problems thereafter and the 
res t  reported no difficulties with this procedure. 
Pilot Estimates of Flight Path Alignment aad Tracking 
A s  the aircraft approaches the DEI, the command pilot must be able 
to determine that its flight path is within specified lateral offset limits 
from the extended runway centerline and that it is tracking so as to remain 
within these limits. The component judgments of estimating lateral 
oofset and tracking vectors, by reference to either flight instruments or 
external visual reference, were  considered suspect in the background 
analysis of flight management task performance (Appendix A, p. A-11). 
Current trends in Category I1 training and equipment procurement suggest 
that qualitative indications of localizer deviation wil l  be relied upon for 
assessing flight path alignment until visual cues fade-in and can be used 
for a final determinaiion of cross-track position and trackjpg tendencies. 
Seventy-eight percent of the pilot estimates of lateral offset, based 
strictly on instrument reference, were  within 25 feet of the aircraft's 
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actual c rms- t rack  position. It is interesting to note that when these 
estimates w e r e  made by external visual reference, only 5670 were  within 
this same accuracy limit. This finding suggests that external visual 
reference under Category II visibility conditions is not an adequate 
information source for "confirming" flight path alignment judgments 
made earlier in the approach by instrument reference. 
The assessment of aircraft tracking tendencies w a s  more 
accurate by visual reference, C)n instruments, errors in judging 
tracking vectors occurred on 4770 of the simulator runs; when the 
tracking judgment was made by visual reference this e r r o r  rate dropped 
to 31'$0. Apparently, the visual cues provide a better basis for detecting 
rate  and direction of movement, even under degraded visibility conditions, 
than the flight situation instruments. 
Summary data on the accuracy of flight path alignment and tracking 
judgments is presented in Table 11. E r r o r  measures a re  derived from 
the differences between pilot estimates of flight path alignment at 
the DH and the recorded values of cross-track position (Y) and drift e) 
at that point in the approach. Arrival at the DH was indicated by the 
pilots by depressing either the AD o r  RA pushbutton on the control wheel 
(see Method section) and both the pilot estimates and recorded values 
of Y and ? were  referenced to this event. 
On the average, pilot estimates of lateral offset were within 
about 20 feet of the actual cross-track position. Again, the variability 
Of pilot estimates was high; at one standard deviation the magnitude Of 
estimate e r r o r s  is about twice as high as the mean. The actual cross-track 
positions judged by the pilots ranged from 0 to more than 150 feet, though 
on most runs they were  less than 50 feet. E r r o r s  in judging the more 
divergent flight paths were clearly larger, as indicated in Figure 9. 
These e r r o r s  in judging the less critical offset positions tend to slightly 
inflate the e r r o r  measures reported in Table 11,but their effect is the 
same across all experimental conditions. 
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Figure 9. Errors in Judging Lateral Offset for Various 
Aircraft Cross-Track Positions at the Decision Height 
Mean estimate e r r o r s  for the "Head-up" condition (judgments made 
solely by external visual reference) appear to be considerably higher than 
those obtained under the nominal "Head-down'' condition (judgments made 
by instrument reference), but the difference is not statistically significant - - - 
2 based on the two data sets, t =; 3.37  and Fgs (1,6) = 5.99]. However, 
when the two conditions are contrasted, using the e r r o r  ratio for lateral 
offset judgments as the criterion measure, the increase in e r r o r s  under 
the "Head-ap" condition is significant with a set at . 05 [ t = 12.25, F g 5  (1,6) 
= 5.99]. This contrast between "Head-up" versus llHead-down'' procedures 
w a s  based on data taken under the same "Fully Automatic" control mode 
and with similar patterns of variation in run conditions operating during 
the two run series. An analysis of variance on e r r o r  ratio data for the 
lateral offset estimate, as indicated in Table 11 disclosed no significant 
effects of either control mode, operational procedure, o r  their interaction. 
2 
66 
Serendipity Inc. 
Erro r s  in  judging the aircraft 's  tracking tendencies occurred on 
about 4070 of the simulator approaches. The e r r o r  ratios presented in 
Table 11 for  this judgment were  based on discrepancies between 
pilot reports of aircraft movement relative to the runway centerline (i. e . ,  
parallel, converging, or  diverging) and the recorded values of Y and Y (see 
Method section). An analysis of variance on these data, arranged in a 
2 x 3 factorial design, disclosed a significant interaction in :he effects of 
Control Mode and Operational Procedurl; on tracking judgments. Summary 
data on p i l o t  performance under c.ach combination of these two variables 
is presented in Table 12. The cell entries in this table are summations of 
error counts for the 36 runs (30 for one combination due to missing data.) 
carried out under each treatment combination. 
0 
Table 12, Number of Pilot Errors in Judging Tracking Tendencies for Six Combina- 
tions of Control Mode and Operational Procedure. 
Control Mode 
When the errof  counts shown in Table 12areconverted to ratios, a 
consistent tendency for  e r r o r s  to increase asthe Control Mode varies from 
Automatic" to "Manual" is apparent, except for the  pairing of the "Head- I' 
down" procedure with the "Manual" mode. This trend and the indicated 
reversal accounts for the significant interaction effects found in the analy- 
sis of variance. A subsequent test of the simple effects of the two variables 
(e. g. ,  the effect of alternative ControlModes when only one Operational Pro- 
cedure is considered at a time) indicated that differences in the effects of 
Control Mode are  significant with 0 set  at . 01. The effect of differences in 
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@erational Procedure was significant at the . 05 ievel for the "Automatic" 
control mode, but not significant for either "Split-axis" of llManuall' modes. 
The overal'r anaiysis is  summarized in Table 13. 
Table 13, Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Control Mode and Operational 
Procedure on Pi lot Tracking Judgments, 
Source of Variation 
Between Pilots 
A (Operational Procedure) 
Subjects within groups 
Within Pilots 
B (ControlMode) 
.48 (Interaction) 
B x Pi lots within groups 
Simple Effects: 
A forbl  (Automatic Mode) 
A for b2 (Split-axis Mode) 
A for b3 (Manual Mode) 
Within Cell 
B for al (Cross-check Procedure) 
B for a2 (Head-down Procedure) 
5 x Pilots within groups 
df 
7 
1 
6 
16 
2 
2 
12 
1 
1 
1 
18 
2 
2 
12 
MS 
031 
,0432 c 
,0606 
,096 
. Q 1 3 1  
, 122 
0 0 4  
0 0 6  
.a35 
e 9 7  
e58 
, 01 31 
- 
F 
0 
4;42 
7,01** 
5,19* 
1,7Q (NS) 
2.55 (NS) 
'Q,8* 
12,3'- 
** F& 12) = 6.93 
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In summary, then, the foregoing analysis shows that subject per - 
formance in judging aircrait tracking tendencies w a s  degraded when 
manual flight control war required, particularly in the split-axis mode, 
and, further, that when flight cmtrol was automatic the number of e r ro r s  
in judging tracking strictly by instrument reference (Head-down) was 
significantly higher than those made when cross-checking of visual cues 
was permitted. An appr: 3nt reversal  of this finding occurred for the 
Under 
this treatment combination, tracking judgments w e r e  correct more often 
than when latew.1 flight path control was  automatic. The fact that the 
pilots w e r p  eztually controlling aircraft tracking tendencies apparently 
had a positive sffect on their :udgments of th is sitvatior,. 
Head-down" conditio3 when full manual control w a s  exercised. I t  
A cursory look at the effects of runway visual range (RVR) on the 
lateral offset and tracking judgment indicates that there is no significant 
difference in performance under the two visibility conditions. Data taken 
on the 36 runs under "Head-up" conditions are summarized in Table 14. 
Table 14 
Accuracy of hteml Offset and Trucking Estimates 
for 1200 Feet and 1600 Feet RVR Conditions 
Measure: 
'0 Mean error i s  P ' s  estimates of 
lateml offset in feet 
(n) - Stand-vd deviation 
- tmotaI lateral offset estimate 
- Error ratio 
- Total tracking iudgment 
- Error ratio 
errors 
errors 
RVR 
30 29 
1 200 feet 1 600 feet 
.45 -44 
5 6 
.25 .37 
In the debriefing sessions, half of the pilots stated that the 
cross-track pogition estimate wa1s the most difficult judgment they were  
asked to make. Two others identified the tracking judgment to be the 
mcst difficult. Only two pilots felt that their cross-track position 
estimates were "highly accurate (within 25 feet)". Four felt they were  
somewhat uncertain" about their estimates and one p i l o t  was "highly 
uncertain -- wouldn't rely on them". The rest (five) felt they were  
. . . close enough (within 50 feet)", It is interesting to note that one 
of the most confident pilots actually was "highly accurate" - his 
averat..  estimate was within 12 feet of the value being judged and the 
variance of his estimates wss the lowest achieved (the standard deviation 
was 11.2 feet). 
I r  
t t  
Both the objective task Fr formance  data and the subjective reports 
thus silpport the contention trat difficulties can be expected in judm-g 
flight path alignment an6 tracking. A U  p i  l o t  s except those specifi- 
caUy instructed to make this judgment by external visual reference 
reported that the expanded localizer indicator on the Flight Director Indicator 
(FDI) was  used as the information source. It should be noted that identifiable 
localizer errors -- such as alignment with the runway ct-zterline, airborne 
centering errors, and course bends -- were  not represented in the simula- 
tion. An analysis of just those localizer errors which are within current 
0967) International Civil Aircraft Organization (ICAO) standards for Category 
II ILS has shown that root sum of square (RSS) localizer e r r o r s  at the DH can 
accumulate to about 55 feet on a three-sigma basis (ref. 8). E r r o r s  of this 
kind must be added on an RSS basis, to e r r o r s  in pilot estimates when these 
judgments are made by reference to ILS-derived instruments such as the 
expanded localizer indicator. 
Pilot's Ability to Predict Approach Success 
MeClsUre: FuI ly Ful I y 
Automatic Spl it Axis Manual 
- Tobl emrs 50 38 42 
(4 (1 08) (72) (66) - Error mtio ,46 0 5 4  ,64 
This component of the approach success judgment was concerned with 
the pilot's ability to effectively "stay-ahead" of the aircraft and is only 
indirectly related to the issues raised in Appendix A. It w a s  considered 
to be of some interest to determine how accurately pilots could 
anticipate their flight situation at the DH by monitoring the ongoing flight 
path offsets and tracking tendencies. A t  300 feet above the runway, just after 
making the relative altitude judgment, p i l o  t s. were  instructed to report 
their predictions regarding the outcome of the approach in terms of 
lateral offset limits. 
All 
130 
( 2 4 )  
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The accuracy gf these predictions is shown in Table 15. Since 'the 
predictions were made prior to the fadc-in of visual cues, differences in 
Operational Procedure are not relevant here; all of the predictions were  
made "Head-down", i. e,, by instrument reference. 
instructed to report "Within" if they were confident that the aircraft  
would arr ive at the DH within +50 feetof the extended runway centerline or 
"Outside" if they felt that these limits would be exceeded. The e r r o r  
counts presented in Table 15 were  based on discrepancies between 
p i l o t  reports and the actual cross-track position of the aircraft at the 
100foot DH. 
Pi  1 o t s were 
- 
It is clear from the e r r o r  ratios in Table 15 that the accuracy of 
pilot predictions ci approach success is no better than chance and possibly 
not as good. It might be argued that the programmed flight proflles used 
Sarendlphy int. 
on Automatic runs  in the simulator w e r e  unrealisticaily unpredictable, 
but the data summarized in Table 15 contradict this notion. E r r o r  ratios 
for tile ",U, Manual" runs a re  clearly higher than those obtained on 
either the "Fully Automatic" or  "Split-axis" runs. An analysis of variance, 
using only the data on the eight pilots who flew all three conditions, indicated 
that Control Mode w a s  not a signiticant factor for  approach success pre- 
dictions (F< 1). 
Much of the e r r o r  in predicting approach success can be attributed 
to a ''positive" or  ''accepting'' bias which was noted in the pilot's pre- 
dictions. A marked preference for reporting that the flight path would 
be within specified offset limits at the DH was apparent, even when the 
aircraft 's actual lateral offset w a s  excessive and/ or  tracking tendencies 
w e r e  diverging. Pilots predicted "Within" on 209 of the 252 experimental 
runs (83%). Only 6570 of these runs were actually within the 50 feet offset 
limits at the DH. 
Effect of Control Task Loading and Operational 
Procedure on Flight Management Task Performance 
Nominal Category I1 conditions represented in the simulation 
called for the flight control function to be fully automatic, leaving the 
pilot free to devote all of his time and attention to the flight management 
task. In addition, pilots were  instructed to adopt a procedure wherein 
all component estimates of the approach success judgment were  made 
strictly by instrument reference, i. e. , the "Head-down" procedure. 
In order to assess the effects of alternative control task loadings and 
operating procedures, additional data on flight management task per- 
formance were obtained under seven combinations of Control Mode and 
Operational Procedure (see Method section). 
The effects of these two factors on specified components of tne 
approach success judgment have already been represented in preceding 
sections. To further explore their effect, a composite index of the 
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overall quality cif the approzch success judgment w a s  adopted as a criterion 
measure. This measure is a weighted summation of e r r o r  counts derived 
from performanc- on each component of the approach success judgment 
(see Methcd sc :tion) and can rarige from 0, when no errors are counted 
for a given run, to a high of 12 per  rm when all possible errors occur. 
M e h i  e r r o r  counts per run, using this composite measure, are 
presected :. Table 16 for each of the seven combinations of the two factors. 
The e. :pc?cted impairment in performance as control task loading increases 
in the mofe iqanual modes is evident for the "Head-down" procedure, but 
bhis trend is reversed when the l'Cross-check" procedure is considered. 
The overbill quality of flight manageinent task performance appea.rs to be 
best when he "Head-up" procedure is paired with the "Fully Automatic" 
control mode. However, e r r o r s  in jii;ging arr ival  at the IIH are not 
reflected in the composite measure for this condition. It wi l l  be recalled 
that p i 1 o t s in the Head-up" group were not required to make the 
relative altitude judgment at the DH by external visual reference. 
I t  
Table 16 
Effect of Control Mode and Opemtioml Procedure on a 
Composite Measure of the Pilot Accuracy of Approach Success Judgments 
Control Mode: 
Opemtioml Procedure: 
Cross -c he ck 
Head-down 
Had-up 
Across Procedures 
Fully Across 
Automatic Split-clxis Fully Manual Ccntrol Modes 
4,42 4.31 3.81 4.17 
(n = 36) (n = 36) (n = 36) ( n  = 108) 
3.53 4.12 4.89 4.18 
(n = 36) (n = 36) (n = 36) (n = 108) 
2.94 NA NA 2.94 
(n = 36; (n = 36) 
3.64 4.22 
(n = 108) (n = 72) (n 4*34 = 72) I- 4.01 (n = 252 
* Cell entries ate mecn composite error scores = see text. 
7 3 
With the data on six combinations ("Head-up" data excluded) arranged 
in a 2 x 3 factorial design with repeated measures ( ref. 6,p. 302), no 
significant differences in error counts were  indicated by analysis of 
variance in either the main effects of the two factors or their interaction. 
A comparison of all mean error counts with the nominal condition 
("Head-down" - Fully Automatic") taken as a control (ref. 6, p. 89), 
also disclosed no significant differences (the largest t statistic computed 
w a s  2.51; Dunnett's 975 (12) = 3.10). The data thus indicate that the 
overall quality of the approach success judgment is the same under all 
of the combinations of Cmt ro l  Mode and Operational Procedure which 
were examined in the study. 
1t 
The earlier analyses of component flight management tasks suggest 
that only the flight path alignment estimates made at the DH were 
differentially affected by variations in Control Mode and Operational 
Procedure. No consistent trend in the effects of these variables is 
evident in the data, however, and the specific influence of increasing control 
task loading and/or varying in formation sources remains unclear. 
Effects of Flight Path Offset at the DH on the 
Success of the Landing Maneuver 
In order to assess pilot performance on flight management tasks, 
a wide range of flight path offset and tracking situations at the DH were 
programmed for  the simulated approach sequences. Displacements 
f rom the glide slope and localizer also occurred when manual flight 
path control w a s  exercised. Landing performance from a variety of 
known offset and lracking conditions could thus be examined in an attempt 
to clarify the problem of establishing appropriate cri teria for defining 
a successful approach (Appendix A, p. A-8) 
The initial criterion measure adopted for assessing the effect of 
flight path offset on landing performance w a s  the probability o r  proportion 
of completely successful touchdowns ( Ps). A completely successful 
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touchdown was one that satisfied the following criteria: 
1. Lateral displacement from the runway centerline was  within 
- +27 feet, 
2. Touchdown along the runway eccurred between the threshold 
and a point located 2500 feet down the runway, 
3. Touchdown rate-of-descent w a s  6 ft. k c .  or less, and 
4. Cross-track velocity at touchdown was 8 f t ,  /sec. o r  less. 
For the landings attempted under the simulated Category 11 conditions 
in the present study, these criteria proved to be. exceedingly difficult 
to satisfy. Even when flight path offsets at the initiation of the landing 
maneuver were  at minimum values (less than 25 feet laterally and within 
12 feet of the prescribed 100-foot decision altitude) and the circraft's track 
was  parallel or converging, only 6% of the tmchdowns were  completely 
successful. Excessive rate-of-descent at touchdown disqualified most 
of the landings; the mean value for this parameter over all landing attempts 
(n = 233) w a s  11.2 ft. /sec. However, lateral displacement from the 
runway centerline w a s  also excessive in many instances and the dispersion 
of touchdown points w a s  high. 
. 
. 
A more complete picture of the touchdown performance data for 
various lateral offset conditions at  the DH is provided in Figure 10. In 
mder to provide a clearer indication of the effects of lateral offset, the 
data summarized in Figure 10 a re  Lased only on runs for  which the aircraft 's 
tracking vector at the DH w a s  aligned with the runway or converging. 
Diverging trackE at this point in the approach were  expected to degrade 
touchdown performame and were omitted from this f irst  inspection of 
the data. 
Mean touchdown positions along the runway are we l l  within the 
2500-foot limit for each of the five lateral offset situations and are all 
near the expected value Of 1000 feet. Seven of the 158 landings repre- 
sented in Figure 10 weRshort of the runway; the distribution of these 
short touchdowns over the five offset conditions is 4, 1, 0, 1, 1. w.1~ 
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four touchdowns exceeded the 2500 foot limit and were  evenly distributed 
over the last four offset conditions. For the most part, then, the second 
criterion fcr successful landings was  easily satisfied. However, the 
excessive touchdown vertical velocities may have been the price paid 
for landing within the touchdown zone. 
With respect to lateral displacement from the runway centerline, 
mean touchdown positions were near or  within the criterion values 
only when lateral cffsets at the DH were 50 feet or  less. When the 
aircraft was more than 100 feet from the approach course, 8 of the 19 
landings were clearly off the edge of the runway. In an analysis of 
usable runway width, allowing for landing gear width restrictions and 
moderate crab angles at touchdown, the amount of runway actually 
available for landing a large jet transport was shown to be about - +45 feet 
from the centerline of a 150-foot runway (ref. 8). Eleven of the 19 landings 
from the widest DH offset position exceeded this offset limit. 
Although the trends in the lateral touchdowr. position data plotted in 
Figure 10 clearly indicate that limits on allowable lateral offset at the 
DH should be set no wider than - +50 feet, the excessive variability around 
the data points precludes any straightforward generalizations. On a one 
standard deviation basis, touchdown8 as far as 73 feet from the centerline 
could occur from minimum offset positions at the DH. Twelve of the 66 
landings attempted from DH offset positions of 25 feet or  less (1870) resulted 
in touchdowns that exceeded limits on uPreful runway width (+45 - feet). 
It is ais0 clear from Figure 10that touchdown rate-of-descent 
and cross-track velocity was excessive on an unacceptably high propor- 
tion of the landing attempts under all of the flight path offset conditions 
considered. Average touchdown rates-of-descent recorded in earlier 
studies, ueing the same simulator and of comparable 
experience, were about 4 ft. /sec. (ref. 9). In these earlier studlea, however, 
flight control was fully manual throughout the approach and landing and 
degraded visibility conditions were not represented in the simulation. 
p i 1 o t 8 
There is an interesting possibility that the very poor touchdown 
performance exhibited in this study, from all offset situations at the DH, 
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supports the contention that the visual cues available under Category I1 
visibility conditions are inadequate for flight control, particularly for 
controlling the aircraft in the vertical axis (see discussion, Appendix A, 
p. A- 17). British investigators have repeatedly stressed this problem, 
as indicated in the following quote: 
The main safety problem in bad weather landing using present- 
day techniques is considered to be the shortcomings of the visual 
control in pitch during the final phase of the approach and land- 
ing especially in low visibilities o . .  . 
Whi l s t  it  is reasonable to expect a proficient pilot to be able to 
assess the aircraft's position and velocity in the horizontal 
plane by looking at a segment of approach lighting which 
includes only one cross  bar, it is more difficult, if not im- 
possible, to make a similar assessment in the pitch plane from 
the same picture. Even gross errors may be difficult to detect 
in the time available after visual contact in operations to the 
lower decision heights of Category 11. ( ref. 10). 
Summary data on touchdown performance under all  conditions of 
flight path offset, tracking vector, and relative altitude at the initiation 
of the landing maneuver are presented in Table 17. Data from 238 
landing attempts are represented in the Table; on 14 of the experi- 
mental runs the pilot elected to abort the landing manuever. It is 
interesting to note that 72% of the DH flight situations w e r e  judged 
to be "Acceptable" by the pilots, i. e. , they indicated that they would 
have attempted the landing. The data in Table 17 shows that only 104 
of the 238 approaches (447'0) were within +50 feet of the runway center- 
line and tracking properly (aligned or converging). Again (see p. 72, 
above), pilots exhibited a positive bias in their  judgment of the flight 
situation. 
- 
There is some tendency for lateral displacements (Pi aid cross- 
track velocities (9) to be higher for the wider  DH offset positions, and 
for the variability in touchdown position and velocities to increase. As 
indicated earlier,  however, touchdown performance is operationally 
marginal or unacceptable for all DH e;.tuations. The proportion of 
successful touchdowns appears to be highest when lateral offsets at the 
DH were between 50 and 75 feet, with a parallel or converging flight 
- 
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Command pilot performance of selected flight management tasks 
during simulated Category I1 approach and landing operations was evalu- 
ated in this study. The intent w a s  to determine the extent to which flight 
instrumentation expected to be available in a baseline low visibility 
lancing system would support the pilot in carrying out his flight manage- 
ment responsibilities. Estimates of pilot performance were  obtained 
under nominal operating conditions and under two alternate combinations 
of operational procedure and flight control mode. In addition, the effects 
of various flight path offset situations at the 100-foot Category I1 decision 
height on the success of the landing maneuver were examined. 
The data obtained in this study support the following conclusions: 
1 . Baseline flight instrur&ientation wi l l  be inadequate for accurate 
monitoring and assessment of the approach to Category I1 minimums. 
Operationally significant e r r o r s  occurred on more than a third of the 
approaches conducted under the condition considered most representa- 
tive of the actual operational situation, i. e., with flight control fully 
automatic and pilot judgment made strictly by instrument reference. 
2. Pilot judgments of height above touchdown w i l l  be unreliable. 
Under nominal conditions, significant e r r o r s  in judging arr ival  at the ' 
100-fsot decision height occurred on 36% of the approaches. Mean pilot 
estimates of height above touchdown at 300 feet and 200 feet were  highly 
accurate, but the variability of these estimates was high. 
3. Variations in terrain elevations approznhing the runway can 
be expected to have a significant adverse effect on relative altitude 
judgments. When 
in the simulation, 
occurred on more 
irregularities in terrain profiles were represented 
e r ro r s  in judging arr ival  at the decisim height 
than 50% of the runs. When coniparativeiy level 
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terrain profiles were represented, e r r o r s  occurred on only 1770 of the 
approaches . 
4. Both the objective task performance data and the pilot's 
subjective reports aupport the contention that difficulties can be expected 
in judging flight path alignment and tracking. Mean estimates of lateral 
offset at the decision height were within 20 feet of the aircraft's actual 
cross-track position, but again the variability was high; at one standard 
deviation the magnitude of estimate e r r o r s  was 45 feet. E r r o r s  in 
judging tracking tendencies occurred on 47% of the approaches under 
nominal conditions. In debriefing session&, half of the pilots 
stated that the cross-track position estimate was the most difficult 
judgment they were asked to make, two others identified the tracking 
judgment as the most difficult, and all but two expressed low confidence 
in their estimates. 
5. External visual I eference under Category I1 visibility conditions 
is not an adequate information eource for confirming flight path align- 
ment estimates made earlier in the approach by instrument reference. 
Seventy eight percent of the lateral offset estirvtes made by instrument 
reference were within 25 feet of the actual cross-track position; when 
the same estimates were  made by visual reference only 5670 were  within 
the 25-foot accuracy limit. 
6. Pilote wil l  not be able to make accurate predictions con- 
cerning the outcome of the approach. The accuracy of approach success 
predict!.o;is was found to  be no better than that expected by chance. 
7. Pilot& wil l  exhibit a positive bias in judging approach success. 
A marked preference for reporting that the flight path would be within 
specified offset limits at the decision height was apparent, even when 
the aircraft 's actual oifset was excessive and/or tracking vectors were 
diverging at the time the predictions were made. 
8. The deviations from nominal conditions in  operational pro- 
cedure and flight control task loading examined in this study w i l l  neither 
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improve nor degrade the overall quality of approach success judgmer,ts. 
N o  significant differences in error counts were indicated by analysis 
of variance in either the main cffects of the two factors or  their inter- 
action. Analysis of components of the approach success judgment 
suggested that flight path alignment and tracking estimates at the de-  
cision height were aifferentially affected by variations in flight control 
mode and procedure, but no consistent trend in the effects of these 
variables was  evident in the data. 
9. Touchdown performance under Category I1 conditions may 
be expected to exceed established criteria for successful 1and;ngs. Even 
when flight path off~ets  at the initiation of the landing maneuver w e r e  at 
minimum values (less than 25 feet laterally and within 12 feet of the 
perscribed 100-foot decision altitude) and the aircraft's track w a s  parallel 
or converging, less than 670 of the touchdowns w e r e  completely successful. 
10. There is an interesting possibility that the poor touchdown 
performance exhibited in this study, from all offset situations at the 
decision height, supports tne often cited contention that visual cues 
available under Category I1 visibility conditions are inadequate for 
flight control during the landing maneuver. jm-ticularly for cantrolling 
the aircraft in the vertical axis. 
The foregoing conclwion stateme2t.s indicate the Fotential impact 
on Category I1 approach and landing operations i f  instrumentation similar 
in function and general design to the baseline system represented in this 
simulator study is used. Summary data cited in support of each conslusim 
reflects the performance of highly qualified airline pilots under a carefully 
developed sirnulatior, of flight management task demands. However, any 
generalization to particular operational situations must be tempered by 
unavoidable limitations in the physical and psychological fidelity of the 
simulation and by the experimental procedures adopted to render the flight 
management task "visible" for measurement and analysis. 
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W i t h  respect to psychological fidelity, for  example, it cannot be 
demonstrated that the sinlulation included all of the infopmation sources 
for pilot judgments which are available in the actual situation or that 
critical visual cues w e r e  faithfully reproduced. Thus, althc q h  visual 
segments appropriate to 1600 and 1200-foot RVR conditions w e r e  accurately 
represented, such factors as  fog structure and the brightness and 
resolution of visual features ia the runway surrounds probably w e r e  not 
phenomenally equivalent to their real world counterparts. The influence 
of such factoL G on the pilot's nead-up judgments and landing performance 
in the simulator is therefore undetermined. 
The general point of the foregoing remarks is that further verification 
of the data presented here is desirable, a s  it is with any simulator study, 
prior to its use in characterizing actual flight operations. However, the 
study raises important questions regarding the adequacy of the flight 
instrumentation which many airlines are planniag to use in Category II 
operations. The data presented are consistent with the findings of earlier 
analyses of pilot factors and flight instrumentation in low visibilit- 
apprclach and landing operations (refs. 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 15, 16 and 18). 
The study documented in this report prmides an additional empirical basis 
for consideration of these issues by the many agencies and individuals 
who are working to assure the effectiveness and safety of low visibility 
approach and landing in jet transport aircraft. 
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Potential Problems in Judging the Success of the ApprDach 
A n  appreciation of the performance objectives of "landing" systems 
developed to satisfy Category I1 operating requirements suggests that 
these systems might be better understood and referred to as approach" 
systems. Under such conditions, landing maneuvers are initiated only 
after the approach is judged to be successful and then only when external 
visual reference is considered acceptable to the pilot-in-command for 
subsequent control of the flare and touchdown. Approach systems can 
also be distinguished from landing systems for  Category I11 conditions, 
since a positive assessment of the approach w i l l  also be necessary before 
automatic control of the landing sequence is initiated. The general con- 
cern in this section is with flight management problems in determining 
the success of the approach to pre-established minimum altitudes where 
the landing commitment decision is finally taken. 
11 
Consideration must first be given to the defining characteristics of 
a "successful1' approach. A s  a point of departure, the following excerpt 
from F A A  Advisory Circular 120-20, dated June 6, 1966, which outlines 
cri teria for the approach of Category I1 landing systems, is given: 
Definition of a Successful Approach. 
airborne system evaluation, a successful approwh is one 
in which, at the 100' point: 
For the purpose of the 
The airplane is in t r im so  as to allow for continuation 
of normal approach and landing. 
The indicated airspeed and heading are  satisfaciory for 
a normal flare and landing. 
system is used, speed must be +5 knots of programmed 
airspeed but may not be less than computed threshold 
speed. 
If an auto throttle control 
The airplane is positioned so that the cockpit is within, 
and tracking so as  to remain within, the lateral con- 
f ines  of the runway extended. 
A - 3 
Serendipity inc. 
(4) Deviation from the glide slope does not exceed +75 
microamps as displayed on the I L S  indicator. 
( 5 )  ?So unusual roughness or excessive attitude changes 
occur after leaving the middle marker. 
The 100-foot point in the foregoing definition is, of course, the 
established decision height for Category I1 operations. 
missed approach must be initiated if the approach is judged unsuccess- 
fu l  or when certain ground and/or airborne equipment operating require- 
ments cannot be satisfied. For Category I11 operations, no formal 
minimum approach altitude has yet been established but it can be assumed 
that a decision height based on minimum altitude requirements for exe- 
cuting a go-around will be determined. 
satisfied in achieving a successful approach are  taken as those de,ling 
with the aircraft 's position and tracking velocities relative to the intendeu 
touchdown area on the runway a s  the descent to the established decision 
height proceeds. 
exprcssed in terms of an "approach gate'' or "window", defined by 
lateral and vertical flight path displacement limits, from which a "soft" 
landing (i. e., a touchdown rate-of-descent of about two feet per second) 
can be ,thieved within a tightly defined touchdown area without exceeding 
autopilot authority limits or imposing excessive demands on pilot ski l ls  
in manually controlling the aircraft. 
At this point a 
The key requirements to be 
Discussions of these requirements are frequently 
Assessing Relative Altitude a s  the Aircraft Approaches the Authorized 
Decision Height. --- 
Relative altitude is the present elevation of the aircraft  relative to 
the elevation of the intended touchdown area on the runway. The appraisal 
of approach success and, under Category I1 conditions, of the adequacy 
of external visual reference for  controlling the subsequent landing maneu- 
ver must be completed before the wheels of the aircraft reach a specified 
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relative altitude, i. e., the decision height. A s  the aircraft  approaches 
the decision height, then, the Captain must monitor and assess  relative 
altitude to ensure that the aircraft  does not proceed below the decision 
height unless the approach is jxdged successful. 
In the projected SST landing system, relative altitude is not directly 
represented. Dual low-range radio altimeter systems w i l l  be available 
and it is assumed that relative altitude judgments must be derived from. 
several  radio altitude displays. Scalar indications of radio altitude, 
resolvable to about five feet, wi l l  be continuously available below 300 
feet. Based on informatiw given in approach charts, an index on the 
radio altimeter can be set  to correspond to the relative altitude at the 
decision height. Below 200 feet, radio altitude is displayed qualitatively 
on the Attitude Director Indicator (ADI) using a "rising runway" symbol, 
In addition, arrival Ert a pilot-selected radio altitude is indicated by both 
a legend light component of the approach progress display and an auditory 
signal. Conventional readouts of barometric altitude wil l  also be available 
and could be used to cross-check o r  supplement radio altitude information. 
During the approach to the decision height, it is assumed that the 
Captain wil l  simply monitor the scalar radio altitude indicator and/or have 
the First Officer call out altitude at 200 feet. When arrival at the decision 
height is imminent, Le . ,  at  approximately 200 feet o r  over the middle 
marker, the Captain will direct primary attention to external visual 
reference and passively monitor the pre-set  aural signal. The First 
Officer wil l  continue to monitor radio altitude displays and may also 
report  arrival at the decision height using established crew communication 
convent ions . 
The principal difficulty i n  this assessment is that the absolute 
altitude indications available from the radio altimeter systems can differ 
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significantly from relative altitude due to irregularities in terrain 
features along the approach path. 
ago (ref. 12): 
A S  Litchford reported several years 
The pilot wants to know his height above h is  touchdown, which 
is some 3300 feet in front of him if he is indeed at 100 feet. 
But ;he terrain leading to the approaches of many of our major 
airports is usually very irregular,  and this is becoming more 
common as  runways a re  extended out over tidal waters and 
ravines to provide suffcient length for  landing jets. 
This point was illustrated by the terrain profiles schematized in 
Figure 2 for twelve major United States airports. 
considerable uncertainty regarding actual height above the intended touch- 
down surface can occur when radar altimeters are used over approaches 
such as  those shown for  the Pittsburgh and Dallas airports. The u s e  of 
a pre-set relative altitude on the radio altimeter wi l l  provide a discrete 
indication of arrival at the decision height, but the problem of anticipating 
arrival at the decision height when approaching w e r  uneven terrain 
remains. 
possible when the approach terrain is higher than the runway elevation. 
The u s e  of currently operational barometric altimeters to supplement 
or cross-check radio altitude displays does not seem promising. Their 
use under Category I1 conditions is considered "basically unsafe'' by the 
ALPA All-Weather Flying Committee (ref. 3)  and in F A A  tests of va-ious 
methods for determining the 100 foot point on the glide slope, barometric 
altimeters were found to be the least accurate technique. Reported dif-  
f,culties include inaccurate pressure settings, effects of rapid pressure 
changes due to wind conditions, inadequate provisions for detecting 
instrument e r rors ,  and instrument readability problems. 
It should be clear that 
False discrete indications of arrival at the decision height are  
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Assessing Flight Path Alignment with the Runway 
A s  indicated earlier,  one of the key requirements to be satisfied 
in a successful approach is that the aircraft 's  position and velocity 
vectors at the decision height a re  such that a l'softlI landing within a 
well-defined touchdown area on the runway can be accomplished with- 
out exceeding autopilot authority and/ o r  pilot-defined maneuvering 
limits. Most analyses of tolerable lateral  offset limits suggest that 
lateral  flight path alignment at the 100-foot decision height should be 
within 50 fret  of the runway centerline extended and that velocity vec- 
tors (flight path projections) should be parallel or  converging with 
respect to this reference line. 
Captain must judge flight path alignment to be within these limits or to 
be correcting s o  a s  to arrive within these limits by the time the decision 
height is reached. 
Approaching the decision height, the 
In the projected landing system, flight path alignment with the 
runway centerline is not directly represented. 
judging flight path alignment is assumed to be the expanded localizer 
deviation indicator. 
the final approach are to maintain the aircraft within - +20 microamps of 
the localizer beam, an indicated deviation of about one-quarter dot 
(ref. 13). As the aircraft closes to tlle decision height, visual cues wil l  
"fade in" and may also be used by the Captain to judge flight path align- 
ment and tracking tendencies. 
the localizer deviation indicator and report excessive cross-track e r ro r  
and/or divergent tracking tendencies when the aircraft arrives at the 
decision height. 
The principal basis for 
Boeing design goals for localizer tracking during 
The Fi rs t  Officer wi l l  continue to monitor 
Some mention should also be made of the "approach gate monitor'' 
cited in  the B-273? Model Specification (ref. 14). 
requirement to 
It is called out as a 
f 1  . . . warn the crew if the airplane exceeds the boundaries 
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of a pre-established 'gate' or 'window' through which a safe landing can 
normally be accomplished". Since no subsequent identification or des  - 
cription of this indicator is provided in the B-2707 proposal documents, 
this display was not included in the landing system design concepts 
adopted in this study. 
There a re  three unresolved issues associated with supporting this 
Each one is cited below in the form of flight management requirement. 
a question and briefly discussed. 
1. What is an appropriate lateral  offset limit for the B-2707 at the 
100-foot decision height? 
F i rm criteria for judging excessive cross-track e r r o r  at the 
decision height have not been establishnd for the SST. 
viously cited F A A  Advisory Circular, absolute limits on the horizontal 
dimensions of the approach gate, at 100 feet, may be se t  at - +75 feet 
from the runway centerline (i. e. ,  tracking within the lateral confines of 
the runway extended, with a standard runway width of 150 feet assumed). 
However, somewhat s t r ic ter  limits must be placed on lateral  displace- 
ment limits when the pilot's ability to correct for a lateral  offset con- 
dition is considered. 
shaded region of localizer deviations from which pilots made acceptable 
manual alignments for proper landings. 
British studies of the ability of airline pilots to execute the "sidestep" 
maneuver, as reported in reference 2.  
From the pre- 
This is illustrated in Figure A-1, which shows a 
These data a re  based on 
Note that lateral  offsets in excess of a 2070 localizer scale 
deflection (approximately 75 feet and consistent with the F A A  limit) 
were clearly ogtside the range of acceptable conditions for  manual 
landing success. Limits on this range of acceptable offsets, begin, 
however, with localizer scale deflections of about 1470 or approximately 
50 feet from the runway centcrline. The reported range of limits for 
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successfill recoveries is due in part to the fact that pilots employed 
different degrees of ro l l  angle in effecting the re-alignment. 
a strict  offset limit of approximately 50 feet is imposed if corrections 
a re  to be made by the autopilot with bank angle commands limited, as 
is usually the case at this point in  the approach, to five degrees. 
Note that 
The pertinent implications of the foregoing a re  that an offset limit 
of -. +50 feet may be a more appropriate criteria1 value for judging exces- 
sive cross-track e r ro r  than the FAA standard of - +75 feet, and, perhaps 
more important, that criteria1 values shquld be based on a determina- 
tion of offset distances from which pilots can comfc:tably perform 
lateral correction maneuvers in the SST. 
obtained using aircraft representative of conventional subsonic jet 
transports and should be derived again for  the SST. 
The data in Figure A-1 were 
A s  Beck has  indicated (ref. 3 ) ,  it may be that pilots would not be 
willing tc  accept any degree of lateral displacement which would neces- 
sitate a correction at the 100-foot point: 
The f i r s t  step that must be required to deliver th i s  aircraft 
to the l l ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ l l  gate at 100 feet wi l  be  the manner in which 
the crew operates the equipment. This ihen involves con- 
sideration of all the ramiiications and techniques t5at will  
have to be employed in a mixed automatic/human environ 
mer.t where  the airplarle is flown to much tighter tolerances, 
because at the 100-foot point, the airplane must be in the 
slot"; that is, aligned with th: runway, on glide slope, on 
speed, at the proper sink ra;e, and stabilized. There can 
- be practically no siaL -step adjustment after b e c z i w s T d .  -
1 1  
Other malyses (ref. 2 )  have indicated that an uncorrected landing 
maneuver, committed on the basis of a n  indicated 207'0 localizer devia- 
tion, could miss the runway completely and that one committed with only 
a 10% deviation can result  in a touchdown dangerously close to the edge 
of the runway. The problem here, then, is that there is currently con- 
siderable uncertainty with respect to the degree of la e~ a1 0ffse.s which 
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should be judged "euczasive" by the SST Captain. 
criteria1 va lues  for this  a. sessnient be establishsd on the basis of 
demonstrated pilot abil i ty and willingness to ,lanually execute a lateral 
correction from the decision height. 
It is suggested that 
2. Can pilots accurately estiniate lateral offset and tracking vectors -- - 
by instrument reference? 
This question is applicable to approach success assessments under 
both CLtegory I1 and 111 conditions. 
loczlizer deviation information used as the primary basis for this zssess- 
ment, togethe- with basic flight situation instruments such as ine heading 
indicator which may also be used, wi l l  not enable pilots ta judge cross- 
track errcr and tracking tendencies to the required accuracies. An early 
indication of this potentisl problem emerged in Phase I1 of the joint F A A -  
USAF Pilot Factors Study of control- display concepts applicable to flying 
the SST under  low visibility cmditions (ref. 15). Phase I1 w a s  conducted, 
in part, to examine advancLd dis ?lay cor,cepts xhkh would enable the 
pilot to manually fly the aircraft to the runway threshold on instruments, 
The following excerpt from the  discuscion of results provides a clear 
statement of the basic problem (underiinirrg addled): 
It suggests that the expanded ILS 
- Control of the Cross-Track Component The lateral require- 
ments foi- routim operation inside the middle marker demand 
more than keeping the aircraft within the center half of the run- 
way. 
creasingly important to the success of the approach urrder 200 
it. 
of the zircraft determines the direction and speed that it moves 
with respect to the runway cer,terlirie. 
cross-track com?onent of the aircraft's lateral veloc't, i v vector 
must be maintained within tolerances about zero so that the 
aircraft w i l l  be moving parallel to the runway centerline uplm 
breakout or, in the case of a touchdown on instruments, 
straight dowr: the runway for roll-out. Certainly, there a re  
trade-offs involved between displacement and the crass-track 
rate component. 
that both para-neiers must be controlled for successful opera- 
lion imide the middle mirker. 
The lateral velocity vector of the aircraft becomes in- 
For  a constant approach speed the lateral velocity vector 
A s  a consequence the 
But in any event, there is no question but 
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Localizer deviation showed that the standard flight 
director displays presented control information which was 
adequate with respect to lateral  displacement inside the 
middle marker. However, the standard flight director con- 
figuration apparently did not provide the proper type D f  
information to the pilot for  maintaining the cross-track com- 
ponent of the aircraft 's  lateral  velacity vector within tolerances. 
Indicative of this inadequacy w a s  the finding that 12;io ot the 
coupled touchdowns, 1SY o of the semi -automatic touchdowns, 
and o of the manual touchdownshzd a cross-track component 
of a magnitude that precluded a safe roll-out. 
tjmes, the hooded subject pilots expressed surpr ise  upon .- a 
A n u m b e r r -  
quick take-over at touchdown that such 
ponent existed. 
cross-track cam- - 
-1 Everything 'looked poodl' -- on the panel. 
This is understandable when one considers the information 
that the flight director presented and the way that it was  dis- 
played. The bank steering bar, wnen centered, was limited 
to telling the pilot that the aircraft  was either on localizer or  
returning at the proper re-intercept rate. The pilot must 
necessarily devote a great deal of attention to the steering 
bars under 200 ft. because they a r e  the primary control ele- 
ments. On the horizontal situa?.ion indicator, displacement 
from localizer w a s  presented bir meails of the Course Devia- 
tion Indicator WDI). 
flected that rate at which the displacement w a s  being incurred 
or reduced; this w a s  an approximation of the lateral  velocity 
vector. But either the location or the quality or a combination 
of both might have been the cause for the pilot's apparently not 
making use  of the lateral  rate information whpn he needed it. 
Heading information was presented by means of a czrd which 
rotated and a fixed index. Quite probably the display w a s  trJo 
insensitive for presenting the quality of information required. 
The rate of movement of the CDI re- 
The problem related to maintaining the cross-track 
component of the lateral velocity vector within tolerances 
using just the standard flight director displays did not ap- 
pear in the T-39 flying until the vertical path information 
requirements had been resolved. Even then the prdblem 
did not become evident until touchdown, because of the quick 
response of the T-39. 
pear further back along the approach with a heavier aircraft. 
Thus, attention should be devoted to satisfying tnis information 
requirement of the pilo' in the lateral  plane. 
The problem undoubtedly would ap- 
In the projected SST landing 
scale localizer deviation indicator 
system, the integration of an expanded 
into the AD1 may improve the pilot's 
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ability to estimate offset distance and cross-track velocities, but this 
possibility should be confirmed. Even with such display improvements, 
however, difficulti- 3 in assessing actual lateral  offset and tracking ten- 
dencies remain due to localizer beam characteristicz and the information 
processing required to translate indicated localizer deflections to offset 
distances in feet. 
One set of problems stems from the well-documented sources of 
These include beam distortions produced noise in the localizer signal. 
by reflectance from large buildings and other objects in the airport s u r -  
rounds, reflection interference from overflying aircraft, spurious tral:s - 
missions due to atmosphere effects and interference from remote 
transmitters,  transmitter drift, etc. Considerable effort is being 
devoted tcr monitoring such noise sources and to controlling their effects 
in the improved Category I1 ILS, but some problems remain. 
problems stem from the fact that information regarding displacement 
from the beam center is provided via localizer receivers as a signal 
Other 
proportionai to angular displacement rather than linear displacement. 
Thus, a given offset distance from the centerline wi l l  produce a variable 
signal depending on the aircraft's distance from the transmitter. Since 
transmitters are typically installed at the far end of the instrument run- 
way, the offset distance corrzsponding to a given beam displacement at 
any given distance from ,,,e runway threshold wi l l  vary as a function of 
runway length. 
In order to determine actual offset distance, then, the Captain 
would require relative transmitter distance information, which wi l l  not 
be available, and would have to recall  a complex conversion table for 
translating qualitative beam deviation indications into microamp dis -  
placements and then into offset distance in feet. 
unreasonable to assume that such data processing w i l l  occur. 
likely that deviation indications on the order of one-quarter dot or less 
It is ,  of course, 
It is 
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w i l l  be accepted as providing adequate runway alignment until, under 
Category I1 conditions, track alignment and tracking can be confirmed 
by external visual refereiAce. Potential problems in using visual cues 
are discussed next; the problem of accurately judging lateral offset and 
cross-track velocities under Category I11 conditions remains. 
C z -  - ilots accurately estimate lateral offset and tracking vectors - 3. 
--_-. Lxternal visual cues? - 
This question is applicable only to an approach under Category I1 
conditions wherein the Captain attempts to assess flight path alignment 
and tracking relative to the runway by reference to visual cues emerging 
in the extremely limited time period just prior to arrival a t  the decision 
height. 
made solely on the basis of instrument reference and visual confirmation, 
strictly speaking, is not required. Elowever, it w i l l  be recalled that the 
Captain is assumed to be "head up'' at this point in the approach in order 
to assess the adequacy of exernal visual reference for the landing and it 
is further assumed that the compelling character of even fragmentary 
visual cues is such that they w i l l  influence his final judgment regardkg 
flight path alignment. 
available from these visual cues may prove to be a highly unreliable 
ba: ,s for judging flight path alignment, and, further, that the severe 
time constraints on resolving the judgment, together with psychological 
factors which can be expected to bias the judgment in favor of a positive 
assessment, w i l l  increase the already high error probability in this 
component of the approach success decision. 
It should be noted that the approach success judgment can be 
The potential problem here is that information 
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The general character of this problem f rom the pi lot ' s  viewpoint 
has been briefly outlined by Beck (ref.  3 )  as  follows: 
N o  pilot under the s t r e s s  of 2 Categcry IT approach, should 
ever be required to mentally process and evaluate what he 
has seen in order to be able to recognize where he is. The 
above considerations now lead directly into the basic con- 
cept of tracking. 
You a re  doing one of three things: tracking on or  parallel 
to, tracking away from, o r  tracking toward a desired path 
over the ground. 
and the visibility is restricted, you can only determine 
where you a r e  by first  observing a known object such a s  a 
light, for example, then observing another light o r  series 
of them and comparing them, basically, with what you first 
saw.  
When you're moving fast  at a low altitude 
Experience has shown that, in order to do this, a pilot must 
see a horizontal segment of lights equivalent to about three 
seconds of reaction time, and in an aircraft  approaching at 
140 knots, h e  w i l l  require a length of at least 700 feet. To 
mentally digest this information, evaluate it, and decide 
whether you are or a re  not tracking as you wish to, may 
take a fraction of a second or it may take several  seconds, 
depending on the clarity, readability and simplicity of your 
cues. You can even complicate and delay this decision by 
having your plane in the not uncommon position w h e r e  it is 
,.awed to the right due to a crosswind and the autopilot has 
placed the plane to the left of the centerline but is now cor- 
recting back to on course" - you think! The cockpit slant 
range visibility is 810 feet and, as  you approach the 100-foot 
decision point, your visual cues a re  appearing outside the 
window to the left. 
1 1  
Now, a r e  you tracking properly or not? From the 100-foot 
decision height to the threshold the pilot wi l l  have approxi- 
mately six seconds, then another six seconds to touchdown. 
During the extremely short interval necessary to make the 
correct decision in this example, there is grave doubt 
whether a pilot can positively recognize a tracking tendency. 
From British studies of low visibility conditions (reE.161, it can 
be concluded that there is a high probability of achieving visual contact 
and a 500-foot vi-sua1 segment prior to reaching the 100-loot decision 
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height, with contact occurring in most instances (7070) at altitudes between 
200 and 300 feet. These data suggest that the total elapsed time from the 
first  "fade-in" of visual cues to arrival at the Category I1 decision height 
w i l l  be on the order of 10 to 15 seconds, assuming a nominal rate of 
descent of about 12 feet per second. During this time interval, which 
must be reduced to allow the pilot to transition from near-field to far-  
f ie ld  viewing conditions and to acquire and recognize usable visual cues, 
the Captain must also assess  his vertical situation and the adequacy of 
visual conditions for completing the landing maneuver under manual con- 
trol. Potential problems in performing these assessment tasks a re  
discussed in subsequent sections, but they are cited here to note that 
some time-sharing among flight management tasks w i l l  be necessary 
during t h i s  brief time interval, further reducing the time available 
for assessing flight path alignment with the runway. 
It is anticipated, then, that pilots may experience considerable 
difficulty in extracting timely and accurate indicators of flight path align- 
ment from visual cues expected to be available in Category I1 conditions., 
Tnis problem is related to the problem of the adequacy of visual cues for 
assessing the vertical situation and the more general issue of what con- 
stitutes "adequate" visual reference for resolving the landing commitment 
decision. 
a r e  also applicable here. 
Discussions of these issues are given later in this report and 
Assessing Vertical F I  
The second major component of the approach success judgment is 
the determination that the aircraft 's  relative altitude (see above), verti- 
cal flight path angle, airspeed, and rate of descent a re  within appropriate 
limits for  effecting a landing within the The touchdown 
zone is defined by the F A A  (ref. 17)as the first 3000 feet of runway, 
t I  touchdown zone". 
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beginning at the threshold, and in specifying Category I1 operating 
requirements this agency requires that a missed approach be initiated 
when a touchdbwn cannot be accomplished within this area. Somewhat 
more stringent constraints on the desired touchdown point have been 
suggested by other interested agencies. 
in a proposed Advisory Circular to the FAA on Automatic Landing Sys- 
tem Standards, dated 14 Decemter 1966, calls for longitudinal touchdown 
dispersion limits of -300 feet to +lo00 feet f rom a line on the runway 
which is the intersection of the linear extension of the glide slope with 
the runway. A s  an indication of preferred touchdown areas  in current 
operations, the mean touchdown pGint .. i510 feet obtained in an F A A  
study of hundreds of jet landings by experienced pilots under visual 
conditions may be cited (ref. 12). 
The A i r  Transport Associatim, 
In any event, the Captain must be confident, prior to roaching the 
established decision height, that the 1a:iding can be completed within an 
acceptable distance from the threshold. On the basis of British studies 
of the adequacy of external visuai reference for  vertical flight path con- 
trol, i t  is reasonable to assume that this assessment must be made 
solely by instrument reference. 
Morrall in a iecent paper (ref. 16): 
This point has been reiterated by 
In making the decision whether to continue with the landing 
o r  not after becoming v is ia l  the pilot must assess  not only 
his position relative to the ideal flight path but also his 
velocities, both cross- trac k and vertical, to determine 
w h e r e  the aircraft is going. 
pect a proficient pilot to be able to assess the aircraft 's 
position and velocity in the horizontal plane by looking at 
a segment of approach lighting which includes only- one cross  
bar, it is more difficult in the absence of the horizon, if not 
impossible, to make a similar assessment in the pitch plane 
from the same picture. Even gross e r r o r s  may be difficult 
to detect in the time available after visual contsct in opera- 
tions to the lower decision heights of Category 11. 
believed that visual control of the aeroplane in pitch begins 
Whilst it is reasonable to ex- 
It is 
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to become reliable when the pilot can see  the threshold and 
does not become really good until he can see the point on 
the ground at which h i s  approach path is heading. 
means that to achieve high standards of safety in these low 
visibility conditions instrument guidance in pitch is required 
to heights of at least 100 feet. 
This 
In the projected SST landing system, the principal basis for making 
this judgment w i l l  be the glide slope deviation indicator and the direct 
readouts of airspeed, radio altitude, and vertical speed. Problems 
associated with the use of radio altit.ude displays for determining relative 
altitude have already been discussed. 
cal  flight path angle is available and no problems are anticipated in 
monitoring airspeed and vertical speed. 
N o  direct representation of verti- 
The potential problem associated with the u s e  of these instruments 
to assess the vertical situation approaching the decision height is that 
the information provided w i l l  not allow the CaptLin to determine that 
his touchdown w i l l  occur within acceptable limits, Following an analy- 
sis of touchdown dispersion outlined by Osder (ref. 2), it can be shown that 
SST touchdowns can occur w e l l  beyond the 3000-foot touchdown zone even 
when the instruments accurately reflect the fact that the aircraft  is pre- 
cisely on the glide slope, maintaining appropriate airspeed and vertical 
velocity, and at the appropriate relative altitude a s  the aircraft arrives 
at the decision height. 
in Figure A-2 which shows the path that would be followed by an aircraft  
initiating a flare from a 2. 5 degree glide slope at approximately 50 feet. 
Assuming a glide slope intersection with the runway at about 1200 feet, 
notice that an ideal flare mar,euver, executed to reduce sinkrate to about 
one foot/second, would result iri a touchdown over 40CO feet down the 
runway. 
The basic elements of this analysis a r e  indicated 
This basic problem is well documented in the literature on proposed 
Category I1 landing systems employing existing ILS installations and it 
is generally conceded that lower minima touchdowns w i l l  occur at a 
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considerable distance down range of the glide slope intersection point. 
Lower minima flareout trajectories s ta r t  tangent to the glide slope 
and thereafter always remain above it. 
1 2 )  indicates that glide slope intersection points range from about 700 feet 
to more than 1500 feet past the runway threshold, s o  the 1200 foot inter- 
section used in Fig. A-2 is not unrealistic. 
initiation wi l l  occur at 75 feet in the SST, rather than the 50 feet used in 
Osder's analysis, the present concern for the Captain's ability to assure  
a touchdown within the touchdown zone can be appreciated. 
Data reported by Litchfor-d (ref. 
When it is recalled that f lare  
Pilots, of course, are concerned about stapping distances and 
prefer  to touchdown much closer to the run-vay threshold, especially under 
low visibility conditions. 
plished by performing a duck under" maneuver as soon as adequate 
visual reference is achieved and prior to initiating the flare. 
w r i t e r s  have pointed out (refs.12, 2, and 3), this maneuver cannot be 
tolerated under Category I1 conditions due to the rapid increase in  sink 
rate that would occur close to the ground. 
In Category I conditions, this has been accom- 
I 1  
A s  many 
The problem posed here is 0r.e of enabling the Captain to determine 
that he can touchdown within acceptable longitudinal distance limits before 
he is committed to land. It should be clear, however, that this is one of 
the major unresolved issues in achieving acceptable low visibility landing 
objectives and wi l l  also affect flight management tasks in assessing the 
initiation and execution of the landing maneuver. 
the wind conditions under which it is performed wi l l ,  of course, finally 
determine where the aircraft w i l l  touchdown. 
associated with i ts  management are outlined in a later section. 
This maneuver and 
Potential problems 
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ORIENTATION 
The Man-Machine integration Branch here at the NASA Ames 
Research Center is engaged in a broad program of research concerned 
with flight crew factors in the operation of commercial jet transport air- 
craft. The study you have been asked to participate in today is being 
carried out by Serendipity, Inc, , under contract to Ames and is cne af 
a series of simulation research projects designed to examine the duties 
and res2onsibifities of the piloe-in-cotnmt?nd during Category 11 approach 
qnd landing operations, You z.re one of the twelve pilots who vere 
specially selected to help us ;totain valid and operationally relevant data 
from the simulation and to p *ornote acceptam.? of study results by the 
aviation c orxnuni t y, 
Our principal objective in conducting this study i s  to determine how 
well command pilots in heavy turbojet aircr*aft will be supportea in their 
role as monitors and decision makers by the "information environment" 
projected for ,..i baseline SST instrumented for Category II approach imd 
landing, This information environment is comprised, primarily, of flighi 
deck instruments and auditory displays (e. g,, aural warniqj signals and 
radio voice communications). It also includes flight plenning information 
and in-flight reference materials sucL as Anproach Charts and €light data 
sheets. We have attempted t o  represent this information enviroament in 
one of Arnes' piloted,fixed base flight sirnufators and we are going to ask 
you to  serve as the pilot-in-command on a series of simulated approach 
and landing sequences. 
€3-3 
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It s:lt:.ald be clearly understocd t h q t  the study is not intended, in 
an). sense, to eva lu t e  ttie quality of your judgmental or decision making 
ab'lities as an individual pilot. 
approach management and ilight control t a s k s  under the conditions 
represe1.tec.i in the ahnuator .  
ments of the aircraft's flight path during the approach, to  judge the suc- 
cess of the approach in t e rms  of your relative position and tracking vector 
at the decision height, and to execute the laming maneuver tnrough the 
touchdowm and roll out on tile runway. Dath taken on each simulatim 
run wil l  be x e d  to  determint? the accuracy and timeliness of the assess- 
ments and decisions you are asked to make. 
are desip-ed to evaluate +he information and displays inade available to 
you a s  t'ie basis fw ;TX jxigments and not to assess your individual s k i l l s  
a-nd abililies. Coe 
design s o  that the cmtribution of individual differences among pilots to  
the study results could be s3~tematical ly  accounted €or in the data 
analysis. 
Your j G b  wil l  be to ca r ry  out c e r h i n  
You wil l  be asked to mrke certain assess- 
A s  noted above, the analyses 
-1 techniques w e r e  deliberately included in the study 
The material presented in th i s  booklet is intended to  prorritie you 
..v.ith an eve-view of *---hat to expect during the rest of the session, to  
briefly identify the s3rr.date.l equipment and operating conditions, and 
to  :utl!r-e tiit: tasks you will  perfoxx as a subject in this experiment. 
f f  you w o d d  l ike to lrncw rnaz'e about ?he aims of the study, we wil l  be 
h2ppy to discuss your interests with ywd after the-completion of the 
experiment. The avaiiabiiity of your experience, sk i l l s ,  and knowledge 
is an important element in t h e  succe!ss of 3u r  investigation and we 
appreciate your contribution of time and effort. 
you for partici;.-qtivg in this project. 
We would l ike  to thank 
H - 4  
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Background Data 
Before proceeding to th2 more specific orientation material, 
please complete the brief Background Data Sheet attached to this book- 
let. 
and will be used in subsequent interpretations of study results. 
wiU not be identified by name in the publication of study results and data 
records for designated individuals will not be released to outside agencies 
o r  individuals. 
The information requested is of interest only to  the project staff 
- You 
-
This also applies to any comments you may make during 
the course of the day or  to opinions yeel will  be asked to express during 
the debriefing session following the completion of the simulator run 
series. 
-- 
General Time Commitment and Schedule of Activities 
You are scheduled to fly a total of runs in the simulator today. 
As soon as this orientation session is Over we w i l l  proceed to the sim- 
ulator crew compartment and car ry  out a series of familiarization runs 
After a brief coffeebreakyou xi11 then complete the first nine runs of 
the experimental series for the rezord. 
fly two refresher runs before completing the last two experimental 
series of nine runs each. 
back here in this  area and t!xt wiil  complete the day's activities. 
- 
Following lunch, we'll let you 
A debriefing sessim will  then be conducted 
It will  take a full day to complete this schedule.* Barring 
unforeseen incidents ar  delays, the schedule should work out as out- 
lined on the next page. 
:::XOTE: This schedule was appropriately modified for pilots assignet' to 
Group 3.  
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0815 - 0900 
0900 - 0915 
0915 - 1100 
1100 - 1300 
1200 - 1300 
1300 - 1315 
1312 - 1430 
1430 - 1445 
1445 - 1545 
1545 - 1600 
1600 - 1630 
Orientation to study 
Coffee break - proceed to sirnulator 
Simulator familiarization & practice run  series 
Complete first experimental run series 
Lmch 
Complete two refresher runs 
Complete second experimental run series 
Break 
Complete third experimental run series 
Break - return to briefing area 
Debriefing 
Flight Sequence and Equipment Xepresented in the Simulation 
The operational cmtext represented in the simulator runs is an 
ILS approach and landing u.-?er Category I1 conditions on runway 1R 
at Dulles Internatiorial Airport, Each run in the simulator wi l l  repre- 
sent the execution of a flight sequence beginning with the aircraft  at  
approximately eight nautical miies from the runway, stabilized on the 
localizer course, and descending tothe assigned initial approach attitude 
This sequence ends with the aircraft on the runway decelerating to a 
nominal turn-off speed. A copy of the current Jeppesen Approach 
Chart for Dulles wi l l  be provided by the Experimenter. 
Aircrzft response characteristics and flight control system 
dynamics represented in the simulat 'w are  those of the DC-8 airplane. 
The crew compartment is a conventional transport-t_pe cab mounted 
on a stationary raised platform (no motion cues are provided). You 
w i l l  occupy the Captain's seat and function as the pilot-in-command on 
all runs. In contrast to the training simulators you have flown, our 
3 - 6  
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research simulator will probably appear to be somewhat x s t e r e .  
attempt has been made to reproduce Lhe flight deck configuration for 
any particular aircraft typz and a full complement of instrumentation and 
controls is not provided. 
be available to you are ideritified in Figure B-1. 
tation and controls on the Captain's side were selected to support the 
approach manage-went and flight control tasks you w i l l  be asked to 
perform. 
the center panel and aisle control stand, but the F i rs t  af icer ' s  station 
is not fully represented and the instruments and contmls typically 
available on overhead panels, side panels, and the control panels mounted 
on the aisle control stand are not available in the simulator. 
No 
The instrumentation and controls which wi l l  
Flight instrumen- 
Some additional instruments and controls are available on 
Petailed familiarization with these instruments and controls 
w i l l  be given at the simulator; however the equipment charadcris t ics  
outlined below should be noted and if you hzve any general questions 
w e  wi l l  a t tcAr;p to resolve them at this time. 
1, Primary flight situation and command information is 
provided by the Collins FD-109 Integrated Fhght System. 
(The principal features cf this system are illustrated 
in the booklet provided by the Experimenter. ) 
2, A full on-dot deflection on the expanded localizer scale 
represents the same 75 micro-amp deviation signal as 
that available on a smzller scale on the Course Indicator. 
At ithe decision point, a full scale deflection would indicate 
a lateral cffset of about 190 feet. 
3. Three different flight control modes wi l l  be tzsed in the 
run series. With th.e AFCS MODE SEJ,ECT control sei 
to AUTO (AFCS relers to the Automatic Flight Control 
System), a fully coiiplea control mode i; represented 
(i. e. , both localizer and glide slope tracking wi l l  be 
accomplished by the autopilot). 
selected, a split-axis autopilot mode is represented. 
When ROLL ONLY is 
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wherein localizer tracking continues to be automatic, 
while manual control via the cantrol column is assumed 
in the pitch axis. (In some airuaf t  this mode is selected 
by placing an autopilot control in an elevator disconnect" 
or  "pitch disengage" position. ) The OFF position is 
used when full rianual control in both pitch and roll axes 
is called for  (i. e., the autopilot is either not engaged 
or is used for stability augmentation only). 
I' 
4. An autothrottle function is also simulated. When the 
A / T  control is in the ON position, the selected command 
airspeed (CMD AS SELECT) will  be maintained to within 
- +5 kts automatically. It should be noted, however, that 
in the simulator this wil l  not be accomplished by automatic 
positioning of the throttle levers. 
The simulator is also equipped with a Visual Flight Attachment 
which wil l  provide you with a color TV projection of the runway and 
its sui aunds. Since Category II conditions w i l l  be represented, 
(1200' RVR on some runs, 1600' RVR on others) an "in-cloud" 
condition wi l l  be simulated until the aircraft  is sufficiently close to the 
apprcach lights and/or runway for visual cues to fade-in. Configuration 
A" approach lights w i l l  be siKulated with sequenced flashing lights, 
hi-intensity runway lights, touchdown zone lights; and runway center- 
line lights also available. 
?I 
OPERATING PROCEDURE 
Your role in the simulation sequence, as  already indicated, wi l l  
be to act as pilot-in-command and to carry out designated flight 
management and control tasks. 
orgoing assessment of the success of the approach to the decision 
W e  a re  primarily interested in your 
B-5 
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height (DH). 
the outcome of judgments you make regarding the aircraft 's  lateral 
offset from the assigned approach course, its relative altitude (i. e. ,  
height above the runway touchdown zone), and its tracking vector 
(i. e. ,  alignment of the aircraft 's flight path with the approach course). 
Olr evcry run, regardless of the aircrait 's  offset position at the DH, 
when you determine that you a re  precisely at the 100-foot DH you wi l l  
disengage the AFCS, if it is engaged, and execute the landing maneuver 
under manual control. 
At specified points in the sequence you w i l l  indicate 
The general procedures you wi l l  follow on each run  are outlined 
Variations in flight control mode and environmental c anditions below. 
wi l l  occur from run to run and the effects uf these variations on the 
procedures to be followed are noted where  applicable. You wil l  be 
exercised in carrying out these procedures in the simulator prior 
to performing the experimental series. An exFerimenter (E) wi l i  be 
present in the cab to monitor and coordinate the simulation sequence 
on each run. E wi l l  brief you on run conditions azqd wil l  take care of 
certain run setup controls. E w i l l  also handle the gear and fiaps on 
your command. At the start of each run, the simulator wi l l  be appropri- 
ately positicned above the initial approach altitude. You will  initiate 
each run immediately after E gives you your approach clearance (item 
4 below). 
1. Receive Lriefing on run conditions. E wi l l  identify the 
control mode (fully automatic, split-axis, or fGlly manual) 
and the approach terrain profile for the designated run. 
One of three alternate terrain profiles wi l l  be specified: 
(1) "Level-95I" - this is the actual terrain profile at 
Dulles, 95'  is the Radio Altitude specified on the approach 
chart for the glide slope height at the 100' DH (Inner Marker); 
(2) "Low-140''' - this is the first variation and represents 
a drop in terrain elevation to -40'  relative altitude, the 
Radio Alt i tude cited on the Approach Chart for  this profile 
B-10 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
woyld thus be 140'; (3) "High-85'" - this variation represents 
rising terrain to a relative altitude of +15l, published Radio 
Altitude would therefore be 85'. 
Set up flight deck for initial approach: 
Gear  up. 
Naps  set io 30°. 
Set airspeed bug to programmed speed for initial approach 
(150 kts wi?l be used on all runs). 
Select AFCS mode in accordance with E's briefing 
(item 1 above). 
If run is not fully manual, engage autothrottle function 
(A/T control to ON) and seiect initial command airspeed. 
If A / T  function is used, 2osition throttles for disconnect 
(this is a simulator-peculiar item, thiottles should be set 
to a thrust index of 5,000 lbs). 
Set Radio Altimeter reference bug to appropriate DH 
value (item 1 above). 
Trim aircraft for initial approach (or for AFCS disconnect). 
E wi l l  indicate readiness to start +he run. Acknowledge by 
placing simulator in OPERATE mode, using control on left 
side of cockpit. 
Simulation will  now go dynamic. Monitor flight instruments 
and voice communications. 
If selected AFCS mode is not automatic, hand-fly aircraft a s  
required. Initial 'maneuver is to descend to initial approach 
altitude. 
Monitor decrease in glide slope deviation as aircraft approaches 
the Outer Marker (OM). 
Call for gear extension at one-dot below glide slope and flap 
extensiofi to 50° crossing OM. 
B-11 
8. Monitor glide slope capture. 
9. Call for adjustment of commaRd airspeed to 135 K. 
10. Continue to assess localizer and glide slope tracking. When 
you are confident that the aircraft is at preciseiy 300' above 
the touchdown zone, depress, and release the Height Above 
Touchdown (HAT) button on the inboard horn of the control 
wheel. 
11. When you a re  confident that the aircraft is at precisely 200' 
above the touchdown zone, again depress and release the HAT 
button. 
12. At any time after Middle Marker passage and prior to arr ival  
at the DH, at your discretion, report your prediction regarding 
the outcome of the approach. If you a r e  confident, based on 
your assessment of the aircraft 's flight path and projected 
position, that you wi l l  arr ive at the DH with both: -
a) A lateral offset no greater than 50' on either side of 
the extended runway centerline, and 
b) A vertical displacement from the glide slope no greater 
than 12' (high or  low), 
make a verbal report as follows: "DH POSITION WILL BE 
WITHIN LIMITS. 
these offset limits wil l  be excee ed, report: "DH POSITION 
WILL BE OUTSIDE LIMITS. " If you do nat feel confident that 
you can predict the outcome of the approach, make no report. 
I '  If you are confident that oae or both of 
w 
13. Request instruction from E regarding procedure to be followed 
in transitioning to visual reference. It is important that you 
carefully follow the suggested procedure on all scheduled runs. 
14. Fifty feet abovs the bug setting on the Radio Altimeter, an 
aJditory alert tone wil! sound in your headset. At the onset 
of this tone, carefully estimate the aircraf t ' s  cross-track 
position (lateral displacement from the extended runway center 
- Serendipity inc. 
line) and i ts  tracking vector (drift as the aircraft approaches 
the DH and prepare to report this estimate to E, using the 
intercom system. Give your best estimate of cross-track 
position in feet on arrival at the 100' DH and then report the 
aircraft's tracking vector 2 3  . . . ON" o r  ' I . .  . PARALLEL" 
when the flight path of the aircraft at that time is judged to 
be aligned with the extended runway center line, report 
". . . TRACK DIVERGING" when the aircraft  is judged to be 
moving away from this track, o r  report 'I. .TRACK 
CONVERGING" when the aircraft is judged to be moving in 
toward the runway from an offset position. The general 
format for this report wi l l  thus be as follows: 
11 
"ESTIMATE OFFSET AT THE DH TO BE 
I t  FEET LEFT, TRACKING PARALLEL. 
When this report is given, add your own judgment regarding 
the acceptability of the approach. 
craft 's position and tracking tendencies at DH, report 
"APPROACH ACCEPTABLE I' i f  you wou1.d routinely attempt 
a landing given the same conditions in actual flight, or 
"IbIISSED APPROACH" i f  you would routinely reject the 
approach and go-around. Thi; decision should not include a 
consideration of the adequacy of external visual reference. 
Based solely upon the air-  
15. When you are confident that the aircraft is a t  precisely 100' 
above the runway, ti. e . ,  at the DH), depress and release 
the AFCS DISENGAGE button on the left horn of the control 
wheel. This control is necessary on all runs, whether the 
I. 
AFCS - is "engaged" o r  not, to indicak your judgment of 
arr ival  at the 100' DH. On runs using the fully-automatic 
or  split-axis mode, both the AFCS and A / T  wil l  be disengaged 
when this button is depressed and you wi l l  irimediately assume 
full manual control. On runs made from the outset under full 
manual control, no change in control mode wi l l  occur, and 
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you will  continue to hand-fly the aircraft through the 
landing maneuver. 
16. Execution of the landing maneuver should be accomplished 
by external visual reference with cross-checking of flight 
instruments at your discretion. Your goal, of course, is 
to correct your alignment with the runway, if necessary, 
and achieve an acceptably soft touchdown on the runway 
within the 3,000-foot touchdown zone. 
established touchdown limits, you should attempt to land 
within +27  feet of the runway center line and at a point 
along the runway where you can see at least the last four 
bars of the touchdown zone lights. We would like you to 
attempt the landing on every approach, even when you feel 
that your offset situation at the DH is excessive. However, 
do not use control techniques that you wonld not use under 
actual Category I1 approach conditions, i. e.,  do not use 
excessive roll rates or bank angles, and do not accept an 
excessively hard landing in order to touchdown within the 
limits just  cited. Remember, this exercise is not a test  
of your ability to salvage a bad approach. Touchdown ger -  
formance wi l l  be interpreted a s  an indication of aircraft 
response characteristic under the conditions represented 
in the simulation, not as an assessment of your piloting 
skills. If at any time after initiating the landing attempt 
you fecl that a safe touchdown on the n i ? ~ w a y  cannot be 
accomplished without excessive maneuvering, initiate a 
go-around and /or terminate the simulation sequenoe by 
depressing the IC control. 
To stay within 
- 
At. some p i a t  during the roll-out, reposition the simulator for the 
next run in the scheduled ser ies  by depressing the IC button. The general 
position just outlined will then be repeated for the next scheduled run. If 
you have any questions regardirig the procedures just outlined, please a sk  
the expe r imenter for  f u r t h e r  clarification. 
J3-I4 
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SUBJECT-FILOT DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE 
Based on your experience in carrying out the flight management 
activities during the simulation exercise, we w c u d  like you to comment 
on certain aspects of the procedures employed, the simulation equip- 
ment, and your reactions to the task we asked you to  perform. 
addition, we would likr to solicit your opinion regarding operational 
procedures, flight instrumentation, control techniques, etc. , which 
might be developed to make your job safer and easier in carrying out 
actual approach and landing operations under Category II condiiions. 
In 
1. Did you consider the study orientation and simulator familiarization 
you received to be adequate preparation for the tasks  you were 
asked to perform? If got, what additiohal information or familiar- 
ization exercise do you think would have been helpful? 
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2. Did any of the simulated flight instruments, controls, o r  procedures 
differ significantly from your experie-pe with Category II certified 
aircraft (or from your expectations of what Category ZI equipment 
would be like)? 
3. Which flight instrtiments o r  other sources of information did you 
use to assess lateral offset from the localizer course early in the 
approach (i.e. , prior to reaching 500 feet)? List them in the 
general order of their importance or  usefulness to you. 
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4. Was the use of the LO button to indicate your lateral offset 
judgment awkward or limiting in any way? 
5. Which instruments or other sources of information did you use 
to estimate relative altitude at 300 feet-? At 200 feet? Arrival 
at the 100 foot decision height (DH)? . 
c-5 
6. Was the use of the HAT button for indicating this judgment awkward 
or limiting ? 
7. Which instruments (or information1 did you use to estimate 
cross-track position at the decision height? 
C-6 
8. How confident do you feel about your quantitative estimates of 
cross-track position at the decision point? 
a. 
b. 
C .  
d. 
They were highly accurate (within 25 €eet) 
They were close enough (within 50 feet) 
I was somewhat uncertain about them 
I was highly uncertain - wouldn't rely on them 
C-7 
Serendiaitv inc. 
9. Where do you think the lateral offset limits at the decision heigh: 
should be set, i. e. , what is t h e  maximum lateral displacement 
in feet that you would accept as an initial condition for a routine 
landing maneuver ? 
9a. How about vertical offset limits, in te rms  of feet above or below 
the glide slope on arrival at the Inner Marker? 
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10. Did you notice anything peculiar about the behavior of the flight 
instruments or their agreement with each other during fully- 
coupled runs? 
11. Were there any peculiarities of the flight simulator or the 
procedures you were asked to follow which you feel made your 
behavior in the simulator differ from what you would do in an 
actual Category I1 situation? 
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12. Which particular judgments or estimates did you find most 
difficult? 
13. What additional instrumentation or changes in how available 
instruments are designed do you feel would improve your ability 
to monitor a Category II approach or increase your confidence 
'in judging the ongoing flight situation? 
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14. Are there any particular aspects of Category I1 equipment 
availability, design, or operating procedures that you have 
become aware of in your Category IJ -raining and familiarization 
that you feel are being neglected o r  require more emphasis? 
15. Witn just the equipment represented in the simulation for this 
study, would you attempt an approach under: 
1600 feet RVR conditions? 
1200 feet RVR? 
Lower? 
c -11 
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16. Did you feel that your performance of the flight management task  
was degraded on runs where you had to hand fly the airplane in 
the pitch axis or in b t h  axes during the apprcach? W a s  there 
any noticeable difference between the split -axis ("ROLL ONLY") 
and fully manual (AFCS "OFF") mc.,e? 
17. briefly state your general attitude towards flight simulators (in 
te rms  of the validity o r  applicability of simulation data to the 
actual operational situation). 
c-12 
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18. Do you think that your time was well spent in participating in this 
study? (Please feel free to offer any crit ical  comment you would 
care to make in regard to your experience as a subject or to the 
issues raised in the study.) 
C-13 
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APPENDIX D 
COMPUTER PRINT-OUT OF SIMULATOR RUN DATA 
The following computer print-Outs present the e r r o r  counts and the 
recorded values of designated flight situation parameters at key pointe 
in the approach for each run in the experimental schedule. 
tion and practice runs are not inoluded. The data are presented by run 
numbers for each subject. 
Familiariza- 
The data entries in each column of the print-out can be understood 
by reference to the following translation of column headings (the reader 
should consult the Method section for a more complete definition of the 
measures) : 
RUN = The designated run number taken from the experimental 
run schedule. 
C M  = E r r o r  count for the composite measure, Le. ,  the overall 
index of the quality of approach success judgments. 
E2 = E r r o r  count for errors in estimating HAT at 300 feet. 
= E r r o r  count for e r r o r s  in estimating HAT at 200 feet. 
E3 
= E r r o r  count for e r r o r s  in estimating HAT at the 100-foot 
d e  c is ion height . E4 
E5 = E r r o r  count for errors in predicting approach success. 
E7 = E r r o r  count for errors inestimating lateral offset at the decision 
height. 
F9 = E r r o r  count for e r r o r s  in judging tracking tendencies at the 
decision height. 
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I t  I t  = A 1 entry indicates an excessive lateral touchdown position, E1O 
i. e., tmchdown was more than 27 feet from the runway 
center line . 
E l l  = A "iff entry indicates a touchdown position outside longitudinal 
dispersion limits, Le. ,  short of the runway threshold or more 
than 2500 feet down the runway. 
1 1  1 1  PPS = Partial proportion of successful touchdowns -- a 1 entry 
indicates that all four of the criteria for a completely success- 
ful landing were satisfied. 
ZRA3 = The recorded value of the aircraft's height above the runway (Z), 
in feet, when the subject pressed the RA button near 300 feet. 
ZRA2 = TLe recorded value of Z when the RA button was  pressed 
near 200 feet. 
ZAD = The recorded value of 2 when the AFCS was disengaged (or 
when the RA button was  pressed) near 100 feet. 
YAD = The recorded value of aircraft cross-track position (Y), in 
feet, when the subject disengaged the AFCS (or pressed the 
R A  button near 100 feet). 
YDAD = The recorded rate of change in Y, in feet per  second, at the 
same point in the approach (YD is read "Y 5ot"). 
YTD = The recorded value of Y at touchdown. 
. 
YDTD = The recorded value of cross-track velocity (Y), in feet per 
second, at touchdown. 
XTD = The recorded value of distance from the point of glide slope 
intersection with the runway (GSX), in feet, at touchdown; 
since X = 0 at GSX, negative values are beyond this point 
(GSX is located 1900 feet from the runway threshold). 
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HDTD = The recorded value of vertical velocity (rate-of-descent) at 
twxhdom, in feet per second. 
The desigmtors on the side ior 9-run subsets indicate the flight 
control mode used on the associated run series. "FA" represents the 
Fully Autoriatic mode, "SA" stacds for Split-axis, and "FM" identifies 
the Fully PImuc?l runs. 
Ri-n cont!itior.s a re  not specified on the comptlter print-out. This 
The cell information mzy be obtained for each run bv using Table B-1. 
en . r ies  in this table refer to the alierncctive run conditions defined in 
Table 6 of tile body of this report (see p.41). Note that run numbers 
cannot be usca directly in Table B-1. To determine the conditions 
represented for a designated run in the AxSnt-mt, use the following 
procedure: 
1. First determine the control mode (FA, SA, or  FM) used 
on tke I J ~  series,  
2. Then locate the designated run in the associated run series, 
e. g. , the 6th F A  run for  subject 1. 
3. Now determine, from Table B-1, the alternative run condition 
designator for the run under consideration (e. g. , for  the 
6th F A  run for  subject 1, this designator would be "1"). 
4. R e f e r  to Table 6 in the body of the report for a definition of 
the corresponding run conditions (e. g., for designator 1, 
Approach Profile 1, Terrain Profile 1, and an RVR of 1200 
feet were  represented). 
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